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What started as a straightforward 
and curious question – what were the 
human factors behind recent urban 
transportation innovations in the 
United States – turned into a wide 
exploration of civic action, governance, 
and the very meaning of innovation  
for transportation at this moment.  
 We were thrilled to be able to 
study cities and the leadership that 
have made such an indelible mark in 
recent years. But to keep the study 
manageable and useful, we had to 
make some difficult decisions and 
narrow the range of our investigation.  
 Where we might have started 
with a very broad conception of inno-
vation, we found ourselves landing 
on a definition that encapsulated the 
ways that our street moved away 
from the territory of vehicles and 
returned to the realm of people. While 
this may not seem “innovative” in the 
technological sense, that cities would 
introduce bike lane networks, public 
plazas, mini-parks, and bikeshare 
wholesale onto American streets was 
inconceivable as recently as 2005. The 
most recent period of rapid innovation 
was genuinely unusual relative to the 
prior five to six decades during which 
the majority of cities could not make 
these changes even with significant 
federal policy changes. So while we 
started with nearly 30 possible case 
studies that demonstrated progress 
in urban transportation, we ended up 
focusing on the six that provided the 
strongest illustrations of the human 
actions behind urban transportation 
innovation. Even today, the majority 
of cities in the United States remain 
vulnerable to policies and practices 
established long ago. 
 In the end, our study is simply one 
perspective on what it takes to make 
change. We hope that our analysis 
will show that any city can take up 
the fight to bring their streets back to 
their people, as long as they have the 
leaders in place.
Foreword
Recent innovations in urban transportation in the United 
States have consisted of resident-led efforts to create more 
ways of moving around the city. Rather than the adoption 
of new technology, these advances have centered on 
reintroducing human vitality into streets that have been 
lost to cars for decades. Our analysis of the human factors 
behind implementing small-scale change in a wholesale 
way shows that engagement from three areas of society is 
required for a city to innovate.
First and foremost, a civic sector that is resident-led, 
non-elite, and outside government—yet able to persuade 
local politicians to take risks—is paramount to the success 
of any city. Citizen-led campaigns can pressure authorities 
to change direction, diversify the mix of transportation 
options, and also provide evidence of why that change  
would be beneficial. Without a civic sector that can direct 
public support, urban transportation innovation will not 
reach its potential.
Second, a bold mayor and transportation agency head 
who have both the courage to create the vision for a different 
kind of city and the management skills to compel their 
staff to do things differently are essential for the successful 
implementation of any change. Without the vision and 
mandate from the very top of city government, there is little 
chance of urban transportation reforms succeeding in the 
long run.
Finally, agency adoption is essential for the thorough  
implementation of new transportation practices. Without 
staff willing to challenge the existing culture and processes 
within city government, the city would only have pilot 
projects here and there to show for all its efforts. Without 
agency staff adopting new practices, wholesale change is  
not possible.
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The following strategies can encourage more urban 
transportation innovation in the future:
> Encourage civic organizations to emerge and reframe 
transportation issues as quality-of-life issues. 
> Reinforce public support through political organizing 
and leveraging technical expertise or data.
> Bolster the courage of leaders willing to take on 
reform by connecting them with visible public support 
and a compelling communications strategy.
> Position advocates on the inside to catalyze a 
reorientation of city agency and staff culture.
> Perpetuate new norms by changing agency standards.
> Create federal and state policies that recognize and 
reward small-scale urban transportation reform and tip 
the scales toward innovation.
Though much progress has been made in several cities, 
the human-oriented transportation changes examined here 
are not pervasive nationwide. Only a handful of cities have 
made lasting reforms that will stand the test of time, while 
the majority of federal and state transportation policies 
continue to support auto-oriented development. With the 
information here, we hope that more urban residents will 
take up the fi ght and continue to challenge the status quo 
and reclaim the streets that are the lifeblood of their cities.
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For much of history, the hallmark of 
thriving cities was the vibrancy of  
their streets. Streets not only facil-
itated the movement of goods and 
people, they were also where people 
exchanged products and ideas. The 
streets were where citizens carried  
out their public lives. 
 During the postwar years in the 
United States, the classical notion 
of the vibrant street was shattered 
for the average citizen. As the U.S. 
government embarked on building 
the Interstate Highway System, its 
national project to link regions and 
cities from coast to coast, it over-
turned the classical concept of strata 
for one that prioritized personal cars 
and movement. Significant dedicated 
federal funding directed to state 
departments of transportation, the 
creation of new federal and state poli-
cies, and the emergence of new design 
and engineering practices contrib-
uted to the assemblage of a massive 
policy and institutional superstructure 
that was persistently auto-oriented. 
Uniformity in those mono-modal prac-
tices, which were applied regardless of 
context, contributed to the homogeni-
zation of American streets. Many local 
leaders and citizens felt powerless to 
override the institutionalized bias for 
auto-oriented development. 
 These practices, supported by 
policy and funding mechanisms, 
normalized, then calcified. The hall-
marks of the successful street of the 
past seemed to virtually vanish, and 
the classical use of the street evapo-
rated. Over the next several decades,  
a preference for cars permeated  
state transportation plans and 
overpowered other local urban trans-
portation needs. 
 But starting in the mid-2000s, a 
handful of cities accelerated progress 
in reorienting their streets toward 
people. City leaders reclaimed auto 
parking spaces for bike lanes, repur-
posed dead corners for public plazas, 
and built and expanded sidewalks 
throughout their cities. Because bike 
lanes, public plazas, sidewalks, and 
other human-centric street elements 
nearly vanished from the urban 
landscape under the dictates of twen-
tieth-century transportation policy, 
these very elements, as basic as they 
may appear, comprise the major urban 
transportation innovations of the 
twenty-first century.  
 This report looks at several U.S. 
cities—New York, Chicago, Portland, 
Pittsburgh, Denver, and Charlotte—to 
better understand how they turned 
back to people-oriented transporta-
tion. We chose these cities because 
they are the strongest illustrations of 
effects of the human factors behind 
urban transportation innovation. Keep 
in mind that the prioritization of cars 
is still the most common and standard 
transportation practice throughout 
most of the United States. Each city 
has a current reputation for being a 
leader in urban transportation as we 
write this in 2015, but the initial cata-
lyzation and paradigm shift may have 
taken place at different moments. 
Portland is illustrative because its 
moment of change took place in the 
early 1970s, when few peer cities were 
undertaking such changes. Two of our 
cities, Denver and Charlotte, are also 
younger cities, without the foundation 
of a compact urban form or street 
network with which to work. This led 
these cities to pursue change in slightly 
different ways than more mature 
cities such as New York and Chicago. 
Regardless of the differences, reforms 
in each of the cities we examined 
succeeded most when they were 
developed locally. Most changes were 
initiated without a state or federal 
policy mandate. Nor was significant 
additional funding available for these 
kinds of improvements. In spite of 
all these odds, the cities we studied 
found—and continue to find—ways 
to bring back livelier streets that can 
handle a mix of modes. We hope to 
inspire more cities to continue to chal-
lenge the status quo and so we include 
recommendations based on these 
lessons at the end of this report.
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It is worth understanding the 
fundamental effects of today’s trans-
portation policy structure and culture 
in order to emphasize the significance 
of current innovations. Multiple poli-
cies contributed to the significant 
growth of car ownership and urban 
sprawl and to the decline of public 
transportation, walking, and biking 
in America. Such national policies 
resulted in two repercussions that 
contributed to the late twentieth- 
century status quo: the diminished 
ability of cities to retain a multitude 
of ways of moving around their own 
streets and the deepening influence of 
auto-centric planning, development, 
and design practices.  
 Beginning in the 1950s, the 
majority of transportation policy was 
designed by the federal government 
and targeted at state govern-
ments and most importantly were 
almost entirely auto-oriented. These 
top-down policies weakened urban 
authority over the entire trans-
portation system within municipal 
jurisdictions. A preference for cars 
permeated state transportation plans 
and overpowered other local urban 
transportation needs. There was 
significantly more funding for road 
and highway building, and far less for 
mass transit and biking and walking 
facilities. Travel by walking, biking, or 
public transit within the city became 
less of an official concern. As a result, 
main-street retail corridors that once 
provided the social and economic 
cohesion of livable neighborhoods and 
managed a multitude of street cars, 
buses, pedestrians, and bicycles were 
slowly turned over to accommodate 
only cars.  
 Planning and design practices 
reinforced the federal dictates, 
overriding other modes that had 
adequately accommodated local 
travel. Transportation engineers and 
planners found ways to design streets 
to accommodate more cars, with less 
regard for land use. Land appeared 
to be relatively abundant in the U.S., 
and communities needed to make way 
for the new technology: cars. Designs 
for sidewalks shrank or disappeared 
altogether to allow for more vehicles 
in the public right-of-way, which Jane 
Jacobs described as “erosion” in The 
Death and Life of Great American 
Cities, her landmark book about the 
dynamism of neighborhoods in cities 
BEGINNING IN THE 1950S,  
THE MAJORITY OF  
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WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY 
AUTO-ORIENTED.  
WEST SIDE HIGHWAY,  
NEW YORK CITY, 1951. 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
and the negative effects of automo-
bile-centric, modernist planning. She 
goes on to explain: 
“Because of vehicular congestion,  
a street is widened here, another  
is straightened there, a wide  
avenue is converted to one-way 
flow, staggered-signal systems 
are installed for faster movement, 
a bridge is double-decked . . . , an 
expressway is cut through yonder, 
and finally whole webs of express-
ways. More and more land goes  
into parking, to accommodate the 
ever increasing numbers of vehicles 
while they are idle.”  
As time went on, these practices 
became entrenched in design stan-
dards that are still in use. Thus, even if 
local authorities would like to widen or 
include a sidewalk in a new develop-
ment today, engineering and planning 
standards disable the idea.  
 The body of performance indi-
cators established by the federal 
government and state departments 
of transportation steadily began to 
reflect the federal bias toward cars 
over people. Instead of measuring the 
throughput of people, the govern-
ment counted the number of cars. 
Instead of the level of human activity 
or retail sales generated by the street, 
streets that facilitated fast cars and 
no pedestrians were rewarded with 
funding. Indicators of local economic 
and social vibrancy became bereft  
of value.  
 It follows, then, that the cities  
we determined to be the most 
 innovative in recent years were the 
ones that reversed this “erosion” of 
space for people on American streets. 
Local leaders in these cities had to 
cultivate bottom-up approaches to 
bring back walking, biking, and public 
transit to enliven the street, and make 
it a part of urban life again. These 
innovative cities created new stan-
dards and practices that reoriented 
the way their streets would be viewed, 
planned, designed, and managed. 
In essence, innovative cities inverted 
postwar transportation policy with a 
large dose of bottom-up strategies to 
“get it done,” as so many of our inter-
viewees related.
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We examined six cities that have 
achieved significant, recent success: 
New York City, Chicago, Portland, 
Pittsburgh, Denver, and Charlotte. 
Although these cities have varied 
geographic, political, and socioeco-
nomic contexts and are at different 
stages of economic development and 
maturity, they all exhibited similar 
human factors that worked in concert 
to make their reforms a reality.
Robust Civic Vanguard
Cities that innovate in urban trans-
portation have a robust environment 
of civic organizations outside govern-
ment that are in favor of more 
walking, biking, and public-transit use. 
These organizations force the public 
and government leaders to engage 
with their proposals. Usually there 
are myriad organizations, and these 
organizations are the bedrock of the 
bottom-up approach that encourages 
urban transportation innovations. A 
robust civic sector is the single most 
prevalent factor among all the cities 
we studied.  
 First and foremost, civic orga-
nizations such as advocacy groups, 
grassroots organizers, policy think 
tanks, and research institutions have 
more freedom than elected officials 
to explore and launch ideas that 
might appear out of the ordinary and 
politically risky. A vacuum of civic-
minded planning professionals was 
filled by the Allegheny Conference 
on Community Development in 
Pittsburgh, the Metropolitan Planning 
Council in Chicago, and the Regional 
Plan Association in New York City, 
creating plans that would be neutral 
enough to represent a group of 
major business stakeholders yet still 
palatable to elected officials and 
the voting public. The Downtown 
Denver Partnership and Charlotte’s 
Center City Partners are also busi-
ness-led civic organizations focused 
on planning issues. Over time, these 
organizations have not only coor-
dinated local stakeholder interests 
toward common civic goals, they have 
often become research institutions 
that have developed long-range plans. 
What is essential is that local civic 
leaders can develop ideas free from 
bureaucratic constraints and show 
how these ideas can be applied in the 
local context.  
 These organizations, however, 
may not be the ones that create the 
ground strategy. Armed with good 
ideas, other civic organizations can 
persuade reluctant elected officials 
to consider those ideas. Ideas that 
may have fallen out of political favor, 
in spite of their merit, also benefit 
from civic organizations continuing to 
keep those ideas alive in public debate. 
Advocacy organizations, playing 
roles different from those of the civic 
planning organizations mentioned 
above, draw attention to good ideas 
by creating political campaigns. 
Some organizations can fulfill both 
planning and advocacy roles, but 
this is rare. Nearly all the advocacy 
organizations we interviewed, such 
as Transportation Alternatives (New 
York), the Active Transportation 
Alliance (Chicago), Bike Pittsburgh, 
and the Bicycle Transportation 
Alliance of Oregon, were created to 
advance an agenda of increasing 
pedestrian and bicycling space in 
cities. Without the civic sector  
continually pushing the importance  
of an idea and connecting it to the 
public vote, very few innovative ideas 
are implemented.  
NEW YORK CITY REGIONAL  
PLAN ASSOCIATION ASSEMBLY,  
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NANCY BOROWICK.
 Civic organizations of all kinds 
raise the profiles of new ideas by 
finding new ways of communicating 
them. They often reframe ideas 
to attract additional supporters. 
Activists might start with the goal of 
clean air or neighborhood revitaliza-
tion and then land on transportation 
reform as a means to achieving their 
original objective. Portland activists, 
for example, did not set out to build an 
extensive light rail network; they were 
concerned about saving their neigh-
borhoods. With an orientation toward 
broad public benefit, not narrow 
bicycle interests, civic organizations 
can significantly augment support. In 
2005, bicycle activists’ priorities were 
transformed into family-friendly qual-
ity-of-life issues in New York City by 
the New York City Streets Renaissance 
campaign created by Transportation 
Alternatives, Project for Public Spaces, 
and Open Plans.  
 To prove that their ideas are 
helpful to a wide group of people, 
successful civic organizations created 
physical demonstrations that anyone 
could experience to highlight the bene-
fits of their new ideas. Literature and 
the gathering of secondhand research 
is useful, but firsthand evidence from 
a pilot project that shows how imple-
mentation can be accomplished, 
coupled with an evaluation of the pilot 
project, can be particularly effective. 
The Active Transportation Alliance 
pioneered ciclovias—streets closed 
to cars to make space for cyclists 
and pedestrians—in Chicago as a 
public health initiative. Evaluation 
of this pilot program showed that 
more people benefited from phys-
ical activity after the launch of these 
test ciclovias. The positive results of 
this Active Transportation Alliance 
test program then prompted the 
city to create a ciclovia. In New York 
City, Transportation Alternatives 
connected community impact, vulner-
able pedestrians, and street design in 
its pioneering Safe Routes to School 
project in the Bronx and Safe Routes 
for Seniors in Upper Manhattan, both 
of which evolved into federal- and city-
funded programs.  
 Demonstration projects not only 
win over the public, they also challenge 
the municipality’s operational proce-
dures and industry design standards. 
The Active Transportation Alliance 
challenged the idea that people would 
prefer to drive when given the oppor-
tunity to bike or walk. The Safe Routes 
for Seniors program challenged the 
federal standard for the speed at 
which pedestrians walk. The feder-
ally mandated 3.5-feet-per-second 
walking speed was proven to be  
faster than the real average speed of 
senior and young pedestrians. Yet  
this “design speed” is what currently 
guides the timing of signals and the 
width of crosswalks.  
 But providing evidence is not 
enough. Civic organizations must 
convert innovations birthed in the 
advocacy realm into ideas ready for 
adoption by politicians. Often this 
happens through the hard work of 
gathering public input, integrating 
various opinions, and baking those 
views into politically palatable 
programs. More pedestrian space was 
enshrined into mayoral agendas by 
transportation advocates on Rahm 
Emanuel’s and Bill de Blasio’s transi-
tion teams in Chicago and New York, 
respectively, by focusing on increasing 
safety. Bike Pittsburgh’s bike map 
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traced the most popular routes 
already taken by cyclists in the city, 
making the previously invisible bicycle 
community much more  
legitimate. The Safe Routes for 
Seniors program was created as a 
political strategy to engage a major 
voting block: senior citizens. It is  
critical that civic organizations are 
connected to and can deliver political 
supporters for elected officials to 
ensure political saliency in urban trans-
portation innovations. 
 The numerous roles played by 
residents and civic organizations 
described here highlight the many 
kinds of organizations that must 
exist in order to turn a good idea into 
actual change. Think tanks specialize 
in collecting evidence, developing poli-
cies, and publishing reports. Advocates 
craft political strategies and 
engage decision-makers and voters. 
Grassroots organizers pound the 
pavement, collect signatures, and can 
often be the noisemakers. Business 
elites can also be helpful, but they are 
often in support of large infrastruc-
ture projects and usually work in a 
manner similar to that of highway 
coalitions. Without grassroots activist 
organizations, small-scale street 
designs are too easily overlooked. They 
either do not happen or they might 
happen in singular ways: one inter-
section improvement here, one bike 
lane there. While some groups may fill 
many roles, the more diverse the civic 
ecosystem’s organizations and skills, 
the greater the likelihood that a new 
idea launched into the public sphere 
will evolve into a political mandate. 
Bold Leadership
While we found that remarkably little 
reform originated with elected offi-
cials—and that most of the mayors 
who ultimately became champions of 
reform did not enter office with trans-
portation high on their  
agendas—they were critical to the 
adoption and then advancement of 
the agendas thrust upon them by  
civic organizations.  
 Prioritization of transportation 
by a city’s mayor sets two important 
dynamics into motion. As a leader, 
the mayor articulates a vision and 
political rationale for the transpor-
tation reform agenda. As the head 
municipal manager, the mayor directs 
the city staff to execute changes 
and creates a sense of urgency. All of 
our interviewees pointed to empow-
erment and urgency as two critical 
cultural changes that stemmed 
from the leadership of their mayors 
and commissioners. While many 
ideas may have floated around the 
civic environment for years, it was 
the prioritization of transportation 
by the mayor and transportation 
agency head, as leaders of the city and 
managers of the city’s civil servants, 
that made implementation possible.  
 Often the mayor cast a city’s 
transportation vision in different 
terms and then assigned it to new 
people to signal a change in gover-
nance. Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
used PlaNYC, a long-range city 
sustainability plan, as a backdrop for 
transportation reform. The trans-
portation benchmarks included in 
PlaNYC were created for environ-
mental-protection purposes. For its 
implementation, he hired Janette 
Sadik-Khan, a reform-minded trans-
portation commissioner who had 
the courage to move boldly. Mayor 
Emanuel in Chicago followed suit with 
his pick of Gabe Klein, an entrepre-
neur who first tried out his strategies 
as head of the Washington, D.C., 
Department of Transportation but 
who had no professional training 
in transportation or public-sector 
management. Klein’s relative lack 
of government experience was a 
welcome departure from the DOT’s 
history pattern of cronyism, which led 
to stagnation. 
 Having a clear plan, as Mayor 
Bloomberg did, helps strengthen 
public support by first describing a 
broad vision and then laying out ways 
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of achieving that vision in tangible 
terms. Both Gabe Klein and Janette 
Sadik-Khan issued department of 
transportation strategic plans—
Chicago Fast Forward and NYC DOT 
Sustainable Streets—to outline their 
visions for their respective cities. 
Chicago had a complete-streets policy 
and a bicycle policy before Klein took 
office, but little of it resulted in change 
on the ground until Klein developed 
Chicago Fast Forward, a unifying 
strategy. Chicago Fast Forward clar-
ified the vision and goals, articulated 
how transportation would affect the 
city at large, and created a mandate 
for city staff. Marking out the mile-
stones for improvement made the 
department’s activities more trans-
parent, earning public trust.  
 Bold leaders inaugurated new 
management strategies to empower 
staff. Most significantly, leaders 
created a culture of “getting things 
done” even if it meant upending 
past practice and would not accept 
anything less. To achieve this change in 
culture, some transportation agency 
heads filled key staff roles with reform 
advocates who were well versed in 
local politics. Commissioner Sadik-
Khan’s agenda for change benefited 
from like-minded advocates, such as 
Jon Orcutt, her choice as head of her 
strategy office; Andy Wiley-Schwartz, 
from Project for Public Spaces, as 
assistant commissioner for public 
space; and Dani Simons, formerly 
at Transportation Alternatives, as 
director of strategic communica-
tions. In Pittsburgh, Scott Bricker, 
executive director of Bike Pittsburgh, 
the bicycle advocacy organization, 
was nominated in 2014 by Mayor 
Bill Peduto to the Southwestern 
Pennsylvania Commission, the plan-
ning organization responsible for 
setting transportation funding for 
a ten-county area. Decades earlier, 
Mayor Neil Goldschmidt of Portland 
took a similar step when he entered 
office in 1973, hiring like-minded  
planners who had traveled to  
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Europe and strolled and biked its 
boulevards to supplement the  
transportation department.  
 The leaders signaled a new culture 
as they took the reins and unleashed 
new management styles. As Orcutt 
described the environment in NYC, for 
years “people got used to not seeing 
things done.” To signal change, the 
commissioner rewarded new ideas 
with support and encouragement,  
and badgered those who did not fall 
into line. The sense of complacency 
that tended to infiltrate large agen-
cies dissipated as these bold leaders 
took charge.
 In another example of a different 
style of management, bold leaders 
pursued incremental staging of new 
ideas, instead of “all in one” delivery. 
Painting bike lanes and widening 
sidewalks with temporary plastic 
bollards became common in New 
York, Chicago, and other cities. These 
temporary-looking redesigns of the 
street acted as proofs-of-concept, 
spotlighting benefits more quickly 
than the average transportation 
construction project. As Gabe Klein 
said, “I was more concerned with 
moving quickly and improving safety 
than I was in getting every little thing 
right.” The secondary benefit was that 
staff members, who had formerly 
faced opposition to any new idea, 
could experience immediate grat-
ification as a result of incremental 
changes. “People could see that they 
were getting things done, and felt 
good about it,” said Jon Orcutt. 
 Projects lowered political costs by 
appearing experimental and imper-
manent; politicians did not have to 
expend all their political capital on a 
single, permanent project. New York 
City initially marked out the pedes-
trianization of Times Square with 
traffic barrels and cheap lawn chairs, 
inviting people to sit. The true pilot 
projects for Times Square, however, 
were the smaller, less visible, tempo-
rary public plazas in lesser-known 
neighborhoods. When public use 
increased and benefits accrued in 
those sites, the city was able to secure 
more permanent fixtures and move 
to bigger, more visible sites. Times 
Square is now slated for capital funds 
to replace the temporary bollards and 
road paint with a permanent redesign. 
Small, quick, and affordable steps 
make movement toward a bigger 
project possible. Instead of a single 
ribbon-cutting ceremony after months 
of construction hassles, a mayor and 
transportation agency head can claim 
credit as the project progresses. 
Agency Implementers
While we found that advocacy from 
residents was an essential first step 
and that the embrace of an elected 
official is essential, without the 
support of the staff in city agen-
cies—the policy directors, operations 
managers, planners, and engineers—
advocates’ and leaders’ visions for 
lively streets will not last. It is agency 
staff who find new paths to make 
ideas into operational realities and 
create new standards to institu-
tionalize innovations as part of the 
agency’s culture.  
 Advocates-turned-staffers 
can be instrumental in ensuring 
that change occurs quickly. As policy 
director and a key leader behind the 
scenes at the NYC DOT (he has since 
left the department), Jon Orcutt was 
described as “perhaps more important 
than [Commissioner] Sadik-Khan.” 
Orcutt began his career in grassroots 
organizing in 1989, first as executive 
director of Transportation Alternatives 
and then as a founding staffer and 
executive director of the Tri-State 
Transportation Campaign, a nonprofit 
dedicated to reducing car dependency 
in New York, Connecticut, and New 
Jersey. With his decades-long knowl-
edge of neighborhood politics and local 
motivations, Orcutt aptly developed 
policies and strategies that were 
responsive to local political hurdles.  
 Breathing new life into an 
agency can serve to liberate and 
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empower staffers who are reform-
minded. Luann Hamilton, a director 
in the Chicago Department of 
Transportation with more than 
twenty years of agency experience, 
was instrumental in ensuring that the 
agency could implement the ideas 
laid out in Gabe Klein’s Chicago Fast 
Forward plan. She knew how to steer 
the projects through the right chan-
nels and how to avoid pitfalls within 
the institution. Wendy Feuer,  
a longtime advocate of public art,  
had stints in Washington and at advo-
cacy organizations before becoming 
an assistant commissioner of the  
NYC DOT. Her experience in public  
art and urban design allowed her to 
steer and increase the public plaza  
and art programs there, elevating  
the work of the department beyond 
that of transportation. 
 Agency staffers are crucial to the 
development of new standards that 
institutionalize innovations and ensure 
that those new practices endure even 
when the first generation of reformers 
leaves office. Because transportation 
agencies habitually “do things by the 
book,” reformers found it effective to 
literally create new books. NYC DOT 
staff published an urban street design 
manual, a direct challenge to the 
“Green Book,” the longstanding, feder-
ally mandated engineering design 
guidelines published by the American 
Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO). 
The process of developing design 
standards also creates an internal 
knowledge base that enables agency 
staffers to continue to carry out the 
practice. Finally, as we saw from 
the cities we studied, bottom-up 
approaches can be standardized. 
The National Association of City 
Transportation Officials, a member-
ship organization of agency staff, 
has met this demand by publishing 
its Urban Bikeway Design Guide and 
Urban Street Design Guide, with other 
design manuals in progress.
Durability
Strong alignment between civic orga-
nizations, political leadership, and 
agency staff is essential to spark a 
major burst of innovation. In the cities 
we studied, informal partnerships 
between the civic sector and a reform-
minded city agency allowed for the 
alignment of activities and enabled 
innovations to take hold. BikeDenver 
worked with the city council and 
public works staff to keep bicycle 
and pedestrian priorities high on the 
agenda when momentum slowed 
during the turnover between Mayor 
Hickenlooper’s and Mayor Hancock’s 
administrations. Scott Bricker of Bike 
Pittsburgh and Mayor Bill Peduto 
struck a similar relationship to build 
out Pittsburgh’s bicycle network. 
During Portland’s period of signifi-
cant innovation in the early 1970s, it 
was Mayor Neil Goldschmidt’s strong 
relationship with neighborhood civic 
activists and the employment of 
activists in key city roles that propelled 
Portland’s period of change. The 
partnership between civic activists 
and progressive city leaders not only 
made Portland’s 1972 Downtown 
Plan possible, but also enabled its 
execution. The significance of the 
civic sector–government leadership 
relationship, however informally 
developed, was publicly acknowledged 
when the Jane Jacobs Medal for New 
Ideas and Activism was awarded 
in 2010 jointly to Paul Steely White, 
executive director of Transportation 
Alternatives, and NYC DOT 
Commissioner Janette Sadik-Khan for 
their dedication to the livability of New 
York City’s streets. 
 All three human forces for 
change—civic groups, political leaders, 
and agency staff—are necessary for 
innovation, even if they are all capable 
of making some progress on their 
own. In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
Mayor Tom Murphy of Pittsburgh 
also pursued an urban development 
agenda that included sustainable 
transportation. He supported transit 
expansion, updated zoning codes, 
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provided urban design guidelines,  
and created a development fund 
 to encourage reinvestment in  
Pittsburgh. However, lack of align-
ment with the county executive and 
city council and a lack of capacity 
among the civic organizations to 
support sustainable transportation 
made it difficult to expand pedestrian 
and bicycle infrastructure despite  
the Mayor’s intentions. 
 Furthermore, without people 
advocating and coordinating at the 
local level, what few reform-oriented 
state and federal policies there are 
do not necessarily take hold. North 
Carolina has had a statewide bicycle 
policy since 1973, but many of the 
state’s cities lacked the bicycle planner 
and agency buy-in to implement the 
policy. Reform-minded Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation 
Secretary Allen Biehler created a local 
competitive grant program in 2010 to 
compel regional land-use and trans-
portation planning. But without civic 
and political alignment in Allegheny 
County, where Pittsburgh sits, the 
region won only one grant of $25,000, 
a small sum considering that it is the 
second-largest metropolitan region in 
Pennsylvania and that there was $59.4 
million available in the first round. 
Lack of local support and coordination 
can render higher-level policy much 
less effective. 
 When high-level, supportive policy 
is enacted in cities with thriving civic 
organizations, innovations are made 
more durable. Portland stands out as 
a city that has taken a different urban 
transportation path from the majority 
of cities in the United States because 
of a twist of policy fate. Starting in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
city had the trifecta of civic activism, 
bold political leadership, and agency 
reorientation that our other study 
cities have experienced more recently. 
It turned a riverfront road into a 
public park. It fought plans for more 
automobile parking with a down-
town revitalization plan. The changes 
Portland set in motion then have 
endured in the following decades. 
 Two top-level policy changes 
made the 1970s urban transportation 
innovations part of Portland’s DNA. 
The first was the city and state deci-
sion to take advantage of a new (as 
of 1973) federal policy change that 
allowed for the trade-in of highway 
funds for transit. By trading in the 
cancelled Mount Hood Highway for 
yet-unknown public transportation 
and arterial road projects, Portland 
secured a capital source for the first 
installment of its transit future. The 
second major policy change was the 
legislature’s enactment of Governor 
Tom McCall’s recommended state-
wide farmland protection policies in 
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1973. Though the law was created to 
protect natural resources, the creation 
of urban-growth boundaries limited 
the outward expansion of urban areas, 
focusing local planning efforts on 
more efficient uses of urban land. By 
fostering compact land-use planning 
practices that inherently supported 
sustainable urban transportation, 
Oregon essentially built durability 
into urban transportation innovation. 
The key is that the state policies were 
passed at the moment the civic sector 
was fully engaged and local politi-
cians were aligned. It sounds obvious, 
but without local engagement, local 
execution of state and federal policies 
is much more limited.  
 The durability of new practices 
can be reinforced by cities learning 
from one another once one city proves 
the viability of a new concept. When 
Janette Sadik-Khan took office, 
she and New York City Planning 
Commissioner Amanda Burden visited 
Copenhagen with key staff to learn 
about sustainable transportation 
practices. Later on, Denver bicycle 
advocates arranged to have city 
planner Emily Snyder and traffic engi-
neer Justin Schmitz visit New York, 
leading to the creation of their city’s 
first buffered bike lane. When Mayor 
Bill Peduto and County Executive Rich 
Fitzgerald prioritized bus rapid transit 
for the city of Pittsburgh, they took a 
cohort of business leaders, advocates, 
city staff, and other stakeholders to 
Cleveland to learn about the success 
of that city’s HealthLine bus rapid 
transit project. Stakeholders often 
credit study tours with widening their 
horizons, leading to solutions to their 
local problems. These study tours 
offer an intense form of peer-to-peer 
learning and firsthand experience that 
is often critical for mayors and agency 
heads in reorienting governance for 
more livable streets. 
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That resident-led approaches are 
necessary to combat unwanted proj-
ects is not a new idea; citizens have 
led the redirection of governments 
throughout history. New York City 
and Portland owe today’s presence 
of local civic organizations in part to 
the burgeoning environmental and 
social movements that swept the 
country in the 1960s and 70s and to 
the environmental laws that gave 
residents’ challenges legal standing. 
Shifts in attitudes about urban plan-
ning took place at a time in which a 
willingness—and legal basis—to chal-
lenge authority and critical views of 
the establishment were growing: Jane 
Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities was published in 1961, 
and Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
which was instrumental in launching 
the modern environmental move-
ment, was published in 1962. Citizens 
were further empowered to challenge 
governmental decisions regarding 
their local environment through the 
National Environmental Policy Act 
and the Clean Air Act, enacted in 
the 1970s. These social movements 
translated into a renewed focus on 
neighborhoods decades ago, stopping 
many infrastructure projects from 
destroying cities.  
 What is new during the recent 
history of urban transportation inno-
vation is that bottom-up approaches 
have been more often applied by 
multiple sectors working in concert 
toward similar goals. More energy is 
spent saying yes to “good” projects 
than no to “bad” projects. In today’s 
process, more municipal leaders 
and city agency staff have adopted 
bottom-up approaches akin to civic 
organizing. City leaders at the top of 
the pyramid have pursued incremental 
“tactical urbanism” projects. They 
have evaluated each phase before 
pressing on, just as advocates did 
when measuring the benefits of new 
innovations. City leaders have even 
embedded advocates or other people 
outside conventional power structures 
in their city staff. In effect, municipal 
leaders have taken a page out of the 
civic activists’ playbook. 
 Yet the success of the resident-led 
approaches behind the urban trans-
portation innovations examined in this 
report is an aberration in the current 
landscape of American urban devel-
opment. The existing auto-oriented 
policies and institutional structures 
remain strong. Multiple beneficiaries 
including construction labor unions 
continue to defend them. Most metro-
politan regions in the U.S. continue to 
widen roads and infrastructure that 
cater to the automobile, in line with  
the overall policies and goals of the 
federal government as set forth in the 
1950s. Examples abound: Cleveland, 
Ohio, is reconstructing its inner-belt 
freeway, which is a confluence of I-90, 
I-71, and I-77, although automobile 
trips are diminishing and population 
is stable or declining; Michigan State 
Highway planners want to expand 
Interstate 94 through Detroit, demol-
ishing eleven pedestrian bridges in the 
process; and Louisville, Kentucky, is still 
considering adding another highway 
ring. Nationwide, there continue to be 
more examples of highway expansion 
than there are of successful urban 
transportation innovation.  
 Many federal and state policies 
continue to hinder urban innovation 
rather than encourage it. Some state 
highway departments, despite being 
called departments of “transporta-
tion,” hold to design standards and 
practices that inhibit innovation within 
the entire range of options for moving 
people and goods through places, 
and they prioritize the assets they 
own – state highways – over serving 
the broader mobility needs of their 
constituents.  
 The longstanding and current 
obstacles that citizens and govern-
ment leaders still face should not be 
discounted. Nor should we assume 
that all cities are on the cusp of 
change. Looking for an ideal window 
of opportunity in any city where there 
might be well-organized grassroots 
actors to introduce an idea, a high-
ranking official with the authority 
to adopt it and challenge others in 
power, and finally, an empowered city 
staff to carry out and standardize 
the innovation, shows that the effort 
is great indeed. Only a handful out of 
tens of thousands of cities stand out 
as having experienced that moment 
of change. Yet the swiftness by 
which visionary civic, government, 
and agency leaders have positively 
affected the streets and urban life in 
our key case studies shows the impor-
tance of this often-frustrating pursuit. 
To increase the prospects for urban 
transportation innovation, supporters 
must do a combination of the 
following:
Encourage civic organizations to 
emerge and reframe transporta-
tion issues as quality-of-life issues. 
Being able to move around the city 
is a worthy goal in its own right. 
Many civic and grassroots organiza-
tions made tremendous headway, 
however, when transportation was 
not their ultimate goal or when 
transportation goals were purpose-
fully reframed to support another 
goal with broad appeal, such as 
cleaner air or economic opportunity.
Reinforce public support 
through political organizing and 
leveraging technical expertise or 
data. Grassroots organizations 
have the most power to instigate 
change, whether through catching 
the attention of an elected offi-
cial or through building demand 
with the majority of a population. 
Demonstration of technical exper-
tise and providing evidence of wide 
benefits can persuade elected 
officials who need to consider the 
impact of a reform and craft a 
political argument. For example, 
technical capacity can debunk 
established forecasting norms that 
inevitably purport to demonstrate 
the “need” to widen highways, 
regardless of realistic demand and 
fiscal resources. 
Have the courage to take on reform, 
and be prepared. While the ideas 
for reform often originate at the 
grassroots level, a bold, high-ranking 
political figure who is willing to take 
risks and endure short-term criti-
cism is necessary for reform to take 
root and grow. But everyone can 
prepare for such conflicts. Leaders 
are more willing to take unpopular 
stands when they have the support 
of a committed band of voters, such 
as the Riverfront for People coali-
tion in Portland or Transportation 
Alternatives in New York City, 
even if that committed band does 
not represent the majority of the 
population. Sometimes, a strong, 
unexpected leader can be recruited 
from outside the conventional 
structure to accelerate and inspire 
reform. 
Position advocates on the inside 
to catalyze a reorientation of city 
agency and staff culture. Durability 
of new transport policy paradigms 
materializes when bureaucratic 
structures adopt reform. The ability 
of former activists, like Jon Orcutt in 
New York City, to reform an agency 
depends on the leader’s ability not 
only to understand how the bureau-
cracy and local politics work, but 
also to appeal to employees and 
insist on a new way of getting  
things done.
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Perpetuate new norms through 
changing agency standards. For 
reforms to outlast mayoral terms, 
they must eventually be codified 
into agency practice—that is, its 
standards, processes, performance 
measurements, and day-to-day 
operations. Leaders at all levels 
need to push for new practices to 
be officially adopted and carried 
out. Successful reformers must 
redefine how the success of a trans-
portation system is measured so 
that all subsequent practices meet 
the same standards and achieve a 
similar reformist goal. Groups like 
the National Association of City 
Transportation Officials have an 
important role to play in this step.
Create federal and state poli-
cies that recognize and reward 
small-scale urban transportation 
reform and tip the scales toward 
innovation. Although policies from 
broader levels of government still 
require smart implementation by 
local leaders, these policies should 
push cities toward innovation. 
At the very least, states should 
keep the door to innovation open, 
rather than obstruct it. States 
can require integrated land-use 
and transportation planning, as in 
California, or limit urban growth 
to encourage compact develop-
ment, as in Oregon. States can 
also create competitive funds to 
reward sound regional coordination, 
as Pennsylvania did. The federal 
government can commit more 
funding toward sustainable urban 
transportation and adopt perfor-
mance metrics that recognize urban 
vitality over vehicle throughput.  
 Meaningful and durable 
change takes hold when all levels of 
society—residents, leaders, and the 
middle bureaucracy—take up the 
cause. Any single level can create 
change. But the overarching lesson 
is clear: the potential and success 
for urban transportation innovation 
is greatest when citizen activists 
and top-level local government 
officials are working in tandem on 
bottom-up approaches to challenge 
the current transportation policy 
structure. 
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Portland’s culture of planning has 
received accolades and been the 
subject of much analysis, so our anal-
ysis of its story from the late 1960s 
and early 70s is an interpretation 
based on our theory of change in 
transportation. We sought to under-
stand how Portland’s citizens, its 
council members, mayor, and overall 
governance departed from common 
transportation planning practice in 
the United States. No one living in 
Portland in 1969 would have guessed 
that the city would become the exem-
plar for sustainable transportation 
forty years later. At mid-century, 
Portland had adopted cars as early 
and quickly as every other city in the 
United States, and it had dismantled 
its streetcar and transit system back 
in the 1920s, before many other cities. 
As happened in other American cities, 
by the late 1960s, Portland’s elected 
officials and regional authorities, 
along with its civic elite—businessmen 
and property owners—had disinvested 
from the transit system to make way 
for cars and regarded the dismantling 
of old neighborhoods as necessary for 
modernization. In a few short years, 
the direction had changed signifi-
cantly. Perhaps the most remarkable 
part is that the abrupt change in direc-
tion that occurred between 1970 and 
1975 continues to inform Portland’s 
progress today. We found that it was a 
rare and unusual alignment of circum-
stance and leadership during the 
1970s that set the city on its political 
and cultural path toward sustainable 
transportation, a path still being 
followed today.
Civic Environment:  
“We start with our block” 
So said Bill Scott, an early activist in 
Portland’s story, “We realized that 
there were things that we could do to 
start building the better world that 
we realized would be a lot harder on 
the national and international level.” 
Portland would have gone the way  
of many other places were it not for 
citizens and neighborhood groups  
that instigated a movement to 
reclaim the city in the late 1960s and 
throughout the 70s. Many citizens in 
Portland challenged the establish-
ment and its vision of the city using 
the organizing tools they had learned 
in the antiwar, feminist, and civil 
rights movements in the mid-1960s. 
Disillusionment with national politics 
made these idealists return home. 
This shifted to a desire to create 
neighborhoods where families could 
comfortably raise children. They  
were just “people who wanted a  
better neighborhood and a better 
place to live.” 
 Close to home, the business elite, 
the city council, the state highway 
department, and other large institu-
tions were still following the standard 
course of planning. Portland State 
University and Good Samaritan 
Hospital were planning campuses in 
the suburbs. Long-range transpor-
tation plans approved as late as 1969 
still showed how new highways would 
crisscross the entire city. Historic build-
ings seemed doomed for the wrecking 
ball to make way for parking lots. The 
assuredness by which these plans 
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were discussed drew the ire of those 
who had participated in movements 
elsewhere. Keen activists could see 
on the city’s proverbial drawing table 
that there was a “conversion threat” 
to the city, where the powers that be 
were turning outwards toward the 
suburbs, without regard for existing 
neighborhoods or the desire of the 
people. Determination to preserve 
 the natural environment and a  
reaction to the negative effects of 
road building and sprawl in other 
metropolitan areas across the country 
(such as those recounted in Rites of 
Way, the story of a neighborhood that 
defeated the Boston freeway plans) 
prompted some Portlanders to iden-
tify downtown revival and the defeat 
of the Mount Hood Freeway as their 
main goals. 
 A leading strategy for Portland 
citizen activists was to reframe their 
opposition in terms that could draw 
support from the general public. 
Support for the removal of Harbor 
Drive, the highway that cut the down-
town area off from the waterfront, 
gave rise to Riverfront for People. 
A longstanding perception about 
the lack of auto parking—a percep-
tion that led to parking structure 
proposals—was converted into one 
about increasing access for people 
to the downtown core. The framing 
of access developed into one about 
downtown revival as a civic space for 
the middle class. 
 The rallying language was only the 
cover on top of robust activism that 
built political support for city livability. 
The aforementioned Riverfront for 
People, formed in 1969 by stay-at-
home mom Allison Belcher, architect 
Robert Belcher, and fellow architect 
Jim Howell, held gatherings, often in 
the form of picnics along the water-
front, to renew citizen interest in 
waterfront development and in the 
downtown area. Riverfront for People 
joined forces with Ron Buel, chief of 
staff to then-City Commissioner 
Neil Goldschmidt, to form the group 
Sensible Transportation Options for 
People, or STOP, which soon became 
a leader in the region’s anti-freeway 
movement.  
 Top on STOP’s agenda was to 
defeat the proposed Mount Hood 
Freeway, submitted by the Oregon 
Highway Department without citizen 
consultation and scheduled to receive 
hefty federal funds as part of the 1956 
Federal Highway Act. The freeway 
would have cut a five-and-a-half-mile 
swath through historic residential 
districts and destroyed 1,700 homes 
and many businesses in southeast 
Portland. In 1969, the freeway was 
considered a “done deal,” with the 
federal government providing 90 
percent of the funds and the state 
setting aside a 10-percent match; 
the city’s government seemed to 
have little say over the matter. STOP 
joined the Southeast Legal Defense 
Fund, founded by activist Betty 
Merten (who successfully led the fight 
against a proposed parking garage 
above a parking lot, a space that is 
now Pioneer Courthouse Square) and 
Charlie Merten, a prominent public-in-
terest lawyer, to fight the Mount Hood 
Freeway. 
 The actions of STOP were just 
some of the many instances of 
Portland citizens inserting themselves 
into the planning process, in effect 
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redefining this process. The focus of 
their work was not on picketing, but 
they demanded an environmental 
impact statement for the Mount Hood 
Freeway, as was their right thanks to 
the recent passage of the National 
Environmental Protection Act. STOP 
members sat on the Oregon Highway 
Department’s Citizens Advisory 
Committee, went to county, city, and 
neighborhood meetings about the 
matter, and essentially evolved into 
citizen planners, armed with technical 
knowledge about the highway but 
advocating on behalf of the neighbor-
hoods. Notably, members of STOP 
were also involved with campaigning 
for political candidates they felt would 
support their mission, one of whom 
was Neil Goldschmidt.
The collective efforts of citizens built 
momentum for neighborhood pres-
ervation and downtown renewal 
that resulted in a culture of working 
together. The reactivated public 
interest in revitalizing the city’s core 
ultimately coalesced into the 1972 
Downtown Redevelopment Plan, 
which represented a “critical return to 
public life” (Peirce and Guskind 1993). 
Further, the idea that downtown 
is “everyone’s neighborhood” was 
emblematic of the citizen activists’ 
overall emphasis on neighborhoods. 
An in-depth participatory plan-
ning process was conducted for the 
Downtown Plan, one that arrived at 
“doable” guidelines that were shorn of 
obtuse technical language. Citizens 
working alongside planners, busi-
ness leaders, and city government all 
developed a common language and 
understanding that made the vision 
for the city more tangible (Hovey 
2003). The 1972 Downtown Plan 
marked the start of Portland’s tradi-
tion of thinking practically about goals 
and outcomes as well as its culture of 
demystifying planning, and it showed 
Portlanders that the hard work of 
getting everyone on board could 
“result in action, not paralysis” (Peirce 
and Guskind 1993). Critically, the 1972 
Downtown Plan was “an opportunity 
for the citizens of Portland to say: 
Let’s first decide how we want to use 
our Downtown and then determine 
what tools are necessary to achieve 
our land use decisions” and everything 
else—including transportation—
would follow (City of Portland, 1972). 
At that moment in 1972, Portland 
turned toward its city center and 
neighborhoods while the rest of the 
country seemed to turn away. And in 
1972 another thing happened which 
triggered the second element of the 
reform formula: an election was held 
for Mayor. 
Advocates Become 
Politicians
In 1969, the Portland City Council was 
composed entirely of white males 
whose average age was 61, most of 
whom had been in office for multiple 
terms. The adopted transportation 
plan for the region called for multiple 
limited-access highways slicing 
through existing neighborhoods. By 
1974, both the composition of that 
council and the contents of that plan 
had changed dramatically.  
 The late 1960s and early 70s were 
a fluid moment for Portland politics, 
as power passed between the good 
ol’ boy network who had stood guard 
for decades and new leaders who 
embodied the ethos of social justice 
gleaned from movements sweeping 
the country. Three longstanding 
city council members retired after 
the 1970 election, making room for 
new members, who happened to be 
young and passionate, including Neil 
Goldschmidt. Goldschmidt, who later 
became mayor of Portland in 1973, 
adopted the STOP coalition’s goal of 
defeating the Mount Hood Freeway 
and thrust the issue into the political 
arena. As Goldschmidt recounted it, 
“timing is everything.” At thirty-two, 
he was roughly half the age of his 
predecessor Terry Schrunk.  
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 Portland’s civic movements fit 
nicely with Goldschmidt’s political 
style and priorities; not coincidentally, 
those citizen activists were the very 
ones who campaigned for his elec-
tion. Previously a legal-aid attorney, 
he first learned about the growing 
sentiment against urban freeways 
when he canvassed neighborhoods 
while campaigning for the city council 
in 1970 (Thompson 2007). When 
Goldschmidt won the 1972 mayoral 
election, he set out to navigate 
the conflicting desires of the city’s 
citizen advocates and the Oregon 
Department of Transportation. 
He capitalized on the energy and 
momentum already ignited by activ-
ists and “rode it like a skillful surfer on a 
wave” according to Betty Merten. The 
1972 Downtown Plan was also strongly 
aligned with Goldschmidt’s goals 
for the city; while its development 
predated his election he served as a 
figure who could navigate the political 
shoals for implementation.  
 Political leadership for urban 
transportation reform also came 
from the state in the early 1970s—
an Oregon aberration that did not 
occur in Illinois or New York. Governor 
McCall, a conservationist, viewed 
Portland residential reinvestment 
as a means of protecting exurban 
resource lands from sprawl. McCall 
not only championed farmland pres-
ervation policies, which indirectly 
helped preserve inner-city neighbor-
hoods, he also directed the chair of the 
highway commission, Glenn Jackson, 
to accede to Portlanders’ desire to 
limit urban highway expansion. McCall 
and Goldschmidt—a Republican with 
rural interests and a Democratic with 
urban interests—also collaborated on 
strengthening the Portland region’s 
transit system and regional plan-
ning mechanisms. The early 1970s in 
Oregon were one of the few instances 
our study found of a state government 
actively assisting urban innovation.  
 While the activists were adept 
at community organizing and polit-
ical campaigns, they asserted new 
technical prowess. New knowledge 
strengthened the citizen campaign 
against the Mount Hood Freeway 
project. A sympathetic expert working 
with the Oregon Highway Department 
on the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA)–required Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIS) leaked the 
results of the EIS, which made it clear 
that the project would produce unde-
sirable consequences for downtown 
Portland and home and rental prices 
surrounding the freeway. Assertions 
by activists and City Hall about the 
project’s detrimental effects were 
confirmed (OTREC 2010).  
 A change in federal transporta-
tion policy gave the locals the positive 
argument they had previously lacked. 
Under the 1973 Interstate Transfer 
Provision of the Federal Highway Act, 
a result of a compromise stemming 
from congressional disagreement 
over the level of state control of 
federal transportation funding, the 
city and state could for the first time 
transfer the set-aside federal funds 
intended for the Mount Hood highway 
project to other regional transit and 
highway projects. Previously, saying 
no to an urban highway also meant 
saying no to hundreds of millions of 
federal dollars. For the first time, a 
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region could say no to the project but 
still say yes to the money. Backed by 
his constituents, Goldschmidt easily 
convinced Governor McCall. In a 
series of additional political moves, 
Highway Department Commissioner 
Jackson finally agreed, and with that, 
the Mount Hood Freeway project was 
deleted from the plan. Yet approx-
imately $500 million (1974 dollars) 
stayed in the region for other road and 
transit projects.  
 But the 1972 Downtown Plan 
coupled with the Mount Hood Freeway 
reversal meant much more than stop-
ping a highway—it led to Portland’s 
continued sustainable development, 
in which transportation plays a key 
role. As Elsa Coleman, a prominent 
anti-freeway activist and member of 
STOP, attested “. . . it wasn’t just about 
stopping the Mount Hood Freeway; 
it was trying to organize support for 
a different way in Portland.” More 
tangibly, any roads that were built in 
the region further conformed to the 
advocates’ agenda because of the 
required compliance with the state’s 
land-use laws, passed in 1973 by the 
legislature to balance urban inter-
ests with the state’s vast agricultural 
interests. The densification that is 
critical to successful transit systems 
was bolstered by the requirement 
that all cities in the state limit the 
geographic extent of their growth 
with urban-growth boundaries. The 
1972 Downtown Plan provided further 
guidance on how the city’s core would 
accommodate more growth with 
fewer cars. Though the region ulti-
mately submitted a combined list 
of transit and road projects to the 
Federal Highway Administration in 
the late 1970s, the main victory that 
defined the region’s break from the 
status quo was its control over its own 
transportation system through its 
“flexing” of federal funds.  
 Along with state and regional 
policies, the trade-in funding created 
a deep well of financial resources for 
arterial streets as well as for transit, 
pedestrian, and bicycle facilities in the 
region, cementing a culture of regional 
coordination that has since become a 
hallmark of Portland’s transportation 
governance. The agreed-upon  
transit plans resulted in light rail for 
the Portland region. Construction 
began in 1982, and the first line of the 
metropolitan area’s extensive light  
rail network opened in 1986. Plans 
for the region’s light rail system also 
inspired an overhaul of the city’s bus 
network, changing it to a gridded 
system rather than one solely serving 
downtown Portland. Portland’s 
neighborhoods were woven into the 
transportation plans.
 
Change Within
Change inside city government helped 
to maintain momentum from the 
defeat of the highway and build on the 
goodwill and guidance that resulted 
from the 1972 Downtown Plan. Mayor 
Goldschmidt had stripped transpor-
tation planning responsibilities away 
from the city engineer’s office and 
formed a new transportation planning 
office that he staffed with reform-ori-
ented professionals, many of whom 
had visited Europe and experienced a 
wholly different kind of development. 
The planning department ballooned 
from a handful of individuals to thir-
ty-three overnight, and this team, 
with its execution of public transit and 
pedestrian spaces, demonstrated to 
the public that the arduous planning 
process resulted in benefits. This type 
of change from within happened 
again in 1993, when City Commissioner 
Earl Blumenauer (who had been in the 
1973 state legislature which approved 
land use planning) hired bicycle advo-
cate Mia Birk as a staff member in 
Portland’s Bureau of Transportation.  
 The founding members of STOP 
and other reform advocates continued 
to take engaged roles in city and 
regional administrations, grassroots 
organizing, and elected office. Elsa 
Coleman, who fought the parking 
structures downtown, eventually 
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became the downtown parking 
manager, making sure that any 
additional development adhered to 
parking guidelines. That the “guerrilla 
planners” in the early 1970s became 
professional planners and local elected 
representatives kept the city on a 
steady path for decades to come.
State Policies Reinforce 
Local Change
It is worth noting that at the time of 
the Mount Hood Freeway fight, the 
anti-freeway movement in Portland 
was not pervasive, and the young 
mayor’s outspoken opposition to the 
project was unpopular. Goldschmidt 
barely won reelection in 1976, when 
Frank Ivancie ran against him on a 
platform of reviving the highway 
project. Each step of the fight against 
the freeway was a narrow victory,  
as citizens and government officials 
alike had to employ a range of policy 
tools to keep the opportunities for 
change relevant.  
 State policies and new regional 
institutions played key roles in imple-
menting Portland’s vision for land-use 
and transportation planning long 
after the civic battles. Statewide 
land-use laws mandated urban-
growth boundaries (UGB) for urban 
areas and were regulated by the 
Land Conservation and Development 
Commission established in 1973. In 
1977, the state also established the 
Metro Council, a regional governing 
body to oversee the land within the 
Portland metropolitan area UGB. 
Metro would adopt and enforce 
regional plans and make all the 
region’s transportation decisions in 
collaboration with TriMet, the region’s 
transit agency, itself also created in 
the fertile ground of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The Metro Council serves 
as the region’s metropolitan planning 
organization (MPO), but unlike other 
MPOs, it has a home-rule charter 
and councilors are directly elected 
by citizens, ensuring that the body 
reflects the citizen demand to create 
a region-wide vision for the metropol-
itan area (Cotugno and Seltzer 2011). 
TriMet was initially a relatively weak 
agency with very little capacity, but a 
1969 state law allowed transit districts 
to raise taxes through the payroll tax, 
building capacity within the agency 
and establishing it as a partner with 
Metro. TriMet builds and operates 
transportation infrastructure and 
services, while Metro evaluates and 
plans corridors. These regional regula-
tions and agencies embodied the new 
direction of the Portland metropolitan 
area and have succeeded because of 
the high level of inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation. 
 Continuing a dramatic path of 
innovation feels uncertain today, 
with several individuals character-
izing Portland’s planning practices as 
“ossified.” In 2015, controversy rages 
over whether or not Portland will 
allocate resources simply to maintain 
its streets at a state-of-good-repair 
standard, and the TriMet expansion 
which continued steadily apace for 
decades has slowed. A recent Oregon 
Department of Transportation 
proposal to widen Interstate 5, 
which would have benefited auto 
commuters to suburban Washington 
State and harmed inner-city residen-
tial neighborhoods in north Portland, 
was defeated only as recently as 
2013, showing that even the Portland 
region must fight some rearguard 
actions against the conventional 
auto-dominant practices of the past. 
That said, dramatic innovation seems 
unnecessary. Since the 1970s, Portland 
has charged forward on a different 
path based on its expanded transit 
system, pedestrian and bicycle infra-
structure, and measured land-use 
policies. Subsequent updates to the 
Downtown Plan, such as the Central 
City Plan in 1988, did not reject the 
1972 Downtown Plan but, rather, built 
on the central tenets of the earlier 
plan and lessons learned from the 
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defeat of the Mount Hood Freeway 
project: start with land-use decisions 
and provide guidance for practical 
“doability” rather than prescrip-
tive solutions. Portland has had the 
benefit of financial resources for 
these projects since the beginning 
of its transformation, but strains 
are showing now that those federal 
funds have run their course. Portland’s 
elected leaders, its citizens, and 
its culture of planning have helped 
the city progress through economic 
and policy peaks and troughs. While 
today’s progress may not be as 
dramatic as tearing down highways, 
what makes Portland stand apart is 
that for decades after its initial burst 
of innovation in the early 1970s, it has 
carved out a wholly different path of 
urban development. 
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Since 2007, New York City has trans-
formed its streets with the installation 
of hundreds of bike lanes, dozens of 
public plazas formed from underper-
forming street space, and the passage 
of legislation to enforce publication of 
traffic crash data, to allow bikes into 
office buildings, and in 2014, to lower 
the citywide speed limit from 30 to 25 
miles per hour. The city also launched 
improvements to its transit system 
with Select Bus Service, a version 
of bus rapid transit, and Citibike, a 
6,000-bike, 330-station bike-share 
system, with plans for future expan-
sion. The city weathered the 2008 
recession as it pursued these trans-
formations, and for the first time, the 
wild streets and unbridled traffic of 
New York City began to be tamed. 
 Distinctive as it is, the New York 
City story perfectly illustrates a 
universal model of how ideas started 
with civic activist groups, were then 
embraced by elected and appointed 
leaders, and were ultimately institu-
tionalized by staff in the bureaucracy. 
Advocates Lay the 
Groundwork
There may be no better example of 
how an advocacy group got a city to 
adopt its agenda in recent history 
than the story of Transportation 
Alternatives and its role in New York 
City’s transformation. 
 One of the oldest sustainable 
transportation advocacy organiza-
tions in New York City, Transportation 
Alternatives (T.A.) formed in 1973, a 
time of heightened environmental 
consciousness. It initially advocated 
for bicycles as the best form of trans-
portation to counteract the negative 
effects of oil consumption and envi-
ronmental degradation. Though it was 
first known for attention-grabbing 
street-theater stunts—such as part-
nering with bike messengers to stage 
a ride/protest in response to Mayor 
Koch’s 1987 ban on bicycles on Fifth, 
Park, and Madison Avenues—for years, 
many of its actions had minimal effect 
on the city and were unpopular with 
the public. In the case of Koch’s bicycle 
ban, for example, the city backed away 
from the ban only when the state 
declared it invalid on a technicality. The 
group’s original reputation seemed 
marginal to mainstream concerns. 
 As T.A. matured, built its policy 
expertise, increased its membership, 
and expanded its mission to include 
more than cycling concerns, it gained 
momentum and became a political 
force. Its successes include gaining 
24-hour subway access for bicycles in 
1993, a Bicycle Master Plan produced 
by the city with T.A. consultation in 
1997, and even funding from the New 
York State Public Health Department 
to improve walkability for senior citi-
zens in 2003, a savvy political move 
because senior citizens as a demo-
graphic vote at higher rates than the 
rest of the population.  
 T.A.’s base further expanded as 
it built coalitions with organizations 
that sought the same goals, though 
often from different starting points. 
For example, it started to partner with 
public health, senior citizen advocacy, 
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environmental justice, and food justice 
organizations that shared the goal of 
a more livable city. Bonds with other 
transportation organizations were 
strengthened through the well-co-
ordinated use of tactics based on 
organizational strengths. T.A. could 
tap the Regional Plan Association 
for questions about long-term policy 
planning but would turn out its 
members for neighborhood-scale 
proposals—such as a bike lane on a 
specific street—in front of City Council. 
 All of these benchmarks point 
to T.A.’s burgeoning expertise in 
transportation policy and its nascent 
ability to position what started out 
as an urban cycling issue as an urban 
livability issue. By no means was T.A. 
the only organization in New York 
City advocating for these changes. 
Regional Plan Association, Tri-State 
Transportation Campaign, and many 
other organizations also focused on 
transportation reform, but T.A.  
may have benefited from its more 
radical beginnings, which gave the 
organization more room for proposing 
unusual ideas. T.A. was one of many 
organizations that laid the ground-
work, but it was only when there was 
change and alignment in the political 
leadership and environment that T.A. 
was able to advance its agenda in a 
meaningful way.
Political Environment
Several external events in the 
mid-2000s allowed New York City’s 
advocacy community to accelerate 
change. In 2007, Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg published New York City’s 
first urban sustainability plan, called 
PlaNYC. The plan developed sustain-
ability targets for several sectors, 
including transportation, but really 
grew from an interest in economic 
development for the city in response 
to its estimation that it was on target 
to add one million people by 2030. 
Then-Deputy Mayor Dan Doctoroff 
spearheaded the development of 
the plan, seeing its rising prominence 
as a way of promoting the citywide 
economic development that slipped 
out of grasp with the loss of the 2012 
Olympic bid. To broaden its appeal, 
the authors of PlaNYC sought input 
from numerous advocates in many 
fields and adopted some of the 
goals that T.A. had refined over the 
years. PlaNYC would become Mayor 
Bloomberg’s legacy as he began his 
second term and thus brought with it 
a sense of urgency. 
 It was no accident that the mayor, 
an experienced corporate executive, 
placed other non-governmental 
professionals in his administration 
to effectively carry out PlaNYC. He 
created the Office of Long-term 
Planning and Sustainability and 
appointed Rohit Aggarwala, a former 
McKinsey management consultant 
who had contributed to the plan’s 
development, to head the office. 
Bloomberg also hired a new trans-
portation commissioner, Janette 
Sadik-Khan, to meet his administra-
tion’s transportation goals. While 
the most talked-about feature in 
PlaNYC’s transportation chapter 
was the idea of emulating London’s 
congestion pricing program and 
charging a fee for autos entering the 
core area, that proposal required 
the approval of the state legisla-
ture. The legislature balked – not the 
only example in our study of a state 
government thwarting urban trans-
portation reform -  in spite of support 
from the mayor, city council, local 
business, labor, and environmental 
advocates, and major newspaper 
editorial boards. But that failure at the 
state capital convinced the Bloomberg 
administration that its energy was 
better spent on transportation issues 
over which it had full authority, such as 
street design, biking and walking.  
 Around this time, T.A. encoun-
tered a patron who shared its goals 
in Mark Gorton, a financial services 
entrepreneur who further strength-
ened the campaign. Angered by having 
to fight cars on his bike commute from 
his home on the Upper West Side to 
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his office in Tribeca, Gorton endowed 
Transportation Alternatives as well 
as Project for Public Spaces, another 
nonprofit organization that special-
izes in civic engagement, with the 
financial resources to develop a vision 
that would redefine New York City’s 
transportation future. In his view, the 
compelling argument would not be 
how one traveled, but how people’s 
quality of life and their neighborhood 
vitality could be improved. Accordingly, 
the New York City Streets Renaissance 
campaign was launched in 2006 and 
charged with choosing iconic places in 
the city in which to demonstrate the 
potential of streets as public space. 
The changes that T.A. sought in urban 
transportation were reframed as a 
livability issue. 
 Gorton strengthened the 
advocates’ efforts by launching 
Streetsblog, a blog that became a 
means of disseminating information 
about city transportation policy and 
events. He had become frustrated 
that the press paid little attention 
to issues that, in his mind, should be 
as important as crime. Indeed, since 
2000, more people in New York City 
have died annually by traffic fatalities 
than by gun wounds. Streetsblog  
was one of the first media vehicles to  
politicize local transportation matters, 
and it gave the impression that 
sustainable transportation issues had 
a growing constituency. Politicians 
paid attention. 
 With the introduction of the new 
transportation commissioner, the 
leadership of the mayor, financial 
resources, growing political prowess, 
and a reframing of desired trans-
portation changes, New York City’s 
moment of opportunity opened 
wide. On the advocacy side, T.A. and 
its members attended hundreds of 
community board meetings, testified 
at dozens of city council hearings, and 
sent thousands of letters of support 
to elected officials. T.A.’s more sophis-
ticated research and deepening 
technical knowledge expanded its role 
to the extent that community boards 
and City Hall would often call upon 
T.A. representatives to serve as tech-
nical experts at community meetings. 
Similar to the citizen-hosted picnics 
along the Portland waterfront in 
1969, T.A. helped neighborhoods host 
block parties and play streets from 
Soundview, Bronx, to East New York, 
Brooklyn, to Jackson Heights, Queens. 
Neighborhood by neighborhood, it 
reinforced its message that transpor-
tation is a livability issue. Support for 
the livable-streets agenda grew.
Changes within the DOT
Commissioner Sadik-Khan adopted 
the framework of livability and sought 
urban transportation reform through 
many changes in her agency and 
throughout city government by first 
retooling her department. In 2008, the 
city adopted a fully developed Safe 
Routes for Seniors Program (which 
was seeded by that earlier, small New 
York State funding for T.A.), making 
it a part of the DOT’s safety unit. The 
NYC DOT installed its first physically 
protected bike lanes—an exception 
to the design of streets throughout 
the United States and a 180-degree 
turnaround from the days of Koch’s 
bike ban. To reset the work of the 
DOT’s traffic engineers, the city 
created its own design standards with 
the publication of the New York City 
Street Design Manual in 2010. Most 
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important, the department received 
sanction for these changes from the 
city’s legal department and the Office 
of Management and Budget, which 
have for decades relied on highway 
design standards as the guide by 
which to judge the city’s liability for its 
streets. In doing so, the DOT overcame 
an enormous bureaucratic obstacle.  
 Additional DOT-led programs 
reinforced the advocacy community’s 
goal of a livable city, not just more 
biking. Tens of thousands of regular 
citizens, not limited to bicycle advo-
cates, visited the city’s first Summer 
Streets (New York City’s version of 
Latin America’s ciclovia-style street 
openings) in 2009. Play Streets, 
a program that promoted street 
closures as a stimulus for more 
physical activity in dozens of neighbor-
hoods, become an officially sanctioned 
program by the Department of 
Transportation and the Department 
of Health in 2010. The DOT commis-
sioned Jan Gehl Architects, a longtime 
proponent of human-scale street 
design, to analyze priorities for liva-
bility and publish its findings in a 
50-page report, World Class Streets. 
All of these initiatives demonstrated 
to the public that change on the street 
is indeed possible. 
 Finally, regulatory changes 
supported by the commissioner 
and advocates, such as the Bikes 
in Buildings law in 2009 and the 
2011 law that requires the New 
York Police Department to publish 
a monthly record of traffic crashes 
and summonses, ended decades-old 
practices of disregard for bicyclists 
and pedestrians on New York City’s 
streets. New York City was experi-
encing momentum like never before. 
 
The initial window of opportunity, the 
resultant regulatory reforms, and the 
changes in practice built capacity in 
the city for more ambitious innova-
tions with fundamental lasting power. 
New York City launched a 6,000-bike, 
330-station bike-share program in 
2013, with plans for expansion. But 
there was more to come, when Mayor 
Bill de Blasio, Mayor Bloomberg’s 
successor, committed to transporta-
tion improvements initiated during 
the Bloomberg years. This continued 
commitment was all the more stark 
when compared to his disavowal of 
his predecessor in most other arenas. 
Mayor de Blasio backed T.A.’s demand 
from New York State legislature to 
lower the speed limit in New York City 
as a part of the city’s commitment 
to Vision Zero, a program to elimi-
nate traffic fatalities. At each crucial 
moment in the political process, intro-
duction of the reform was backed by 
T.A. and thousands of its members. 
The majority of city-led reforms in 
urban transportation succeeded 
with direct or indirect support from 
T.A., whether in the form of turning 
members out to community meetings 
or giving input on the framing of  
issues or even contributing to the 
development of design manuals 
before their release. 
 Each of the bigger wins in New 
York City represents tens of smaller, 
itinerant struggles, such as a multi-
year campaign to close one entrance 
to Prospect Park so that cyclists and 
pedestrians could enjoy the park 
without the intrusion of cars. But once 
the advocacy group consolidated its 
support and paired it with mayoral 
and commissioner leadership that 
instilled reform throughout the city 
governance structure, urban trans-
portation innovation appeared to be 
unleashed. Gains in urban transporta-
tion improved New York City overall.
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Mayor Bill de Blasio, who took office 
in January 2014, has continued the 
momentum with the groundwork 
established by New York City’s 
advocacy community. An early sign 
of potential is Mayor de Blasio’s 
endorsement of and the city’s 
adoption of Vision Zero in February 
2014, a citywide goal to reduce traffic 
fatalities to zero by 2025. A program 
initially created in Sweden, Vision Zero 
takes a comprehensive approach to 
quelling traffic chaos through design 
as well as through enforcement and 
education. This entails a NYC DOT 
partnership with the New York Police 
Department (NYPD), which would be 
a first for New York City. 
 Our study found that success in 
one area leads to success in others and 
that reform can gather momentum 
as it progresses, even when elected 
offices turn over to new occupants, 
as long as the civic advocacy sector 
continues to thrive. The adoption 
of Vision Zero and its first win, the 
decrease in the citywide speed limit 
from 30 to 25 miles per hour, follows 
the same trajectory as innovations 
in the previous administration, but 
this reform happened much faster. A 
new lobbying organization, Families 
for Safe Streets, formed in January 
2014 after pedestrian fatalities spiked 
in 2013 and early 2014, when more 
than 30 percent of the victims were 
children. Victims’ families banded 
together in their grief and decided to 
seek a reduced city speed limit as their 
first goal.  
 This goal involved going outside 
city authority and asking state 
legislators for permission to change 
the city’s speed limit because of 
arcane regulations from the 1970s. 
Additional resources were needed. 
T.A.’s then-director of campaigns, 
Caroline Samponaro, and its then-
legislative director, Juan Martinez, 
who had formerly served as a 
legislative director for the state 
senate, shaped the newly formed 
organization’s political strategies.  
 The city also took on reform-
minded staff around the same time 
in relatively short order. Mayor de 
Blasio hired Wiley Norvell, a former 
communications director for T.A., 
and appointed Polly Trottenberg 
as the NYC DOT commissioner. 
Commissioner Trottenberg, a former 
legislative director to Senator Daniel 
Moynihan and former chief of staff 
to Senator Chuck Schumer, was 
a transportation reformist and 
was serving as under secretary for 
policy at the U.S. Department of 
Transportation when she received 
the call from New York City. Mayor 
de Blasio adopted Vision Zero as 
the primary strategy for NYC DOT, 
and Commissioner Trottenberg 
was recruited specifically to oversee 
the complex legislative initiatives 
that it would require from the state 
while continuing on the trajectory 
established during the Bloomberg 
years. Once the state legislative 
session ended in June, she hired 
T.A.’s Juan Martinez to lead the NYC 
DOT’s strategic initiatives to oversee 
her programs. With persistent 
campaigning, the support of NYC 
Transportation Commissioner 
Trottenberg, and a reframing of the 
issue of “traffic fatalities” in stark 
personal terms, advocates were able 
to quickly win a campaign to lower the 
speed limit in June 2014. 
 Throughout this process, the 
city demonstrated that it holds the 
key ingredients for transportation 
innovation: an overarching vision, 
well-planted reformists in the mayor’s 
office and the NYC DOT; the backing 
of politically savvy advocates who 
offer powerful, personal perspectives 
on the need for safer streets; and 
many reform-minded NYC DOT 
staff that stayed on under the new 
administration. Commissioner 
Trottenberg and Mayor de Blasio have 
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demonstrated they want to continue 
on the path of change that defined the 
Bloomberg/Sadik-Khan era.  
 Given that this next phase of 
innovation involves the cooperation  
of the NYPD, this campaign will not 
only need leadership from the NYC 
DOT to find tangible ways of showing 
the public that progress is being  
made, it will also need strong, steady 
support from Mayor de Blasio to  
find common ground and foster  
interagency cooperation.  
 A second challenge is how  
subjugated the city is to state or 
even regional powers. The dramatic 
progress a committed vanguard 
of activists could make on street 
redesign is a stark contrast to the 
continued political stalemates which 
stymie progress for NYC’s subway 
and bus system. Since transit riders in 
NYC are far more numerous than  
bicyclists, the political system’s 
seeming indifference to the former 
and responsiveness to the latter 
can only be explained as a failure of 
governance: that the Governor and 
legislature in distant Albany control 
the buses and subways, while the 
Mayor and City Council have more 
authority over the streetscape.  If 
state and agency leadership adopt a 
fresh view of transit in New York City, it 
is not impossible that it would undergo 
a similar kind of transformation. 
  Hudson Yards, a major real estate 
development on top of the Hudson 
rail yards, is another exception: the 
city government realized the No. 
7 line extension as an economic 
development project (it was originally 
part of Doctoroff’s Olympic-bid 
master plan). Although it is an MTA 
project, it was not instigated by the 
MTA.  
 Although there has been reform 
that required state involvement, city-
focused initiatives will always have a 
smoother launch. Regardless of the 
mayor and commissioner, reformers 
will need to rally constituents to 
shake the regional authorities and 
state elected officials out of their old 
ways. New organizations continue 
to agitate for change; in addition to 
Families for Safer Streets, the Riders 
Alliance, formed in 2011 to organize 
transit riders, has reinvigorated the 
community-level political constituency 
for improved transit service. The 
civic community’s ability to develop 
creative strategies that test outdated 
thinking will contribute to more 
departures from the status quo. So 
far, their impact has endured the 
transition from one mayor to the next 
and, hopefully, will continue for many 
years to come.
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Economic 
reinvention and 
new leadership 
prompt new 
approaches to 
transportation.
Pittsburgh3 As in many other innovative urban transportation cities, the gains in 
Pittsburgh are best understood as 
a departure from the city’s past, 
and in this case, it is a break with the 
city’s long history of partnerships 
between the business elite and 
politicians. Pittsburgh’s deindustrial-
ization brought decades of systemic 
economic challenges and depopula-
tion. With a weak city government, 
a jurisdictionally fragmented region, 
and a lack of state and city funding, 
the city did not coalesce around 
sustainable transportation until  
very recently.  
Recent complementary forces—
Pittsburgh’s reorientation away from 
manufacturing and toward higher 
education, medicine, and technology 
in the early 2000s and its desire to 
retain highly educated, young profes-
sionals—gave rise to new approaches 
and new leadership that started to 
challenge the longstanding polit-
ical mechanics behind the region’s 
economic development agenda. 
Progressive politicians who previously 
had to engage with longstanding 
party politics were no longer so 
beholden. Additional political changes 
have created an alignment of 
 leadership and a regional vision  
for transportation at the same time 
that state-level transportation  
policy and funding solutions have 
come into play from above. This is an 
enormous opportunity.
Civic Vanguard
Much of Pittsburgh’s urban develop-
ment and transportation system 
resulted from a top-down approach 
controlled by large institutions. As 
early as the 1930s, civic elites—often 
the chief executives and managers of 
major steel, construction, financial, 
natural resource extraction, and other 
companies headquartered in 
Pittsburgh—drove the city’s develop-
ment agenda. Executives partnered 
with government to successfully elim-
inate the blight, smoke, flooding, and 
pollution that marred the downtown 
area. This resulted in some ironic 
turns, such as the 1940s ban on coal-
burning furnaces in downtown 
Pittsburgh by Mayor David Lawrence. 
More significantly, though, Lawrence 
pioneered the formal organization of 
private business interests, and it was 
during this period that Pittsburgh’s 
centralized approach to economic 
development solidified.  
Influential institutions repre-
sented both private and public 
interests, but participation was 
limited and supported an overarching 
economic development agenda 
geared toward industry and big labor. 
Centralization on the private side was 
best encapsulated by the creation of 
the Allegheny Conference on 
Community Development (ACCD), a 
nonprofit that conducts planning for 
the region and bundles local projects 
to present to and negotiate with the 
state. On the public side were the 
mayor, the city council, the county 
executive, and the county council. 
Even as the partnership added 
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regional heavyweights such as 
Carnegie Mellon University and the 
University of Pittsburgh through 
Strategy 21 in the 1980s, participation 
was limited to those big players who 
would bolster the main agenda, which 
typically consisted of pursuing a 
mega-project or major company that 
could reverse the region’s decline. 
Some big projects were successful 
and many others failed, but this busi-
ness-political dynamic calcified after 
decades of practice, limiting the infil-
tration of new ideas or the type of 
bottom-up movements we found in 
other cities in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The city’s economic development 
strategies, as a reflection of its busi-
ness interests, often overlooked 
center-city transportation. This 
became especially pronounced during 
the Interstate Highway build-out, as 
the power of state transportation 
departments grew with federal 
funding. That, combined with the fact 
that the City of Pittsburgh had little 
control over its own transit system, 
which was largely controlled by the 
county, justified an abdication of 
transportation planning in the city. 
Control over urban transportation 
was ceded to the county and state 
seats of government. The city soon 
found itself constantly fighting to 
fund its own plans. Any city-led effort 
required corporate backers. Mayor 
Tom Murphy negotiated the North 
Shore  Connector with help from 
corporations: the Steelers football 
team, major developers, and other 
business interests all had a hand in 
the project. A system-wide approach 
to transportation that encompassed 
walking, biking, and transit continued 
to be viewed as secondary to the 
overall economic development 
concerns of big industry and big labor. 
In the mid-2000s, though, new 
organizations surfaced to challenge 
the hold of big business (which was 
itself declining) and added new 
perspectives. Efforts starting in the 
2000s to orient the city’s economy 
toward education, health services, 
and finance started to draw popula-
tions back to Pittsburgh, including 
younger people. One of the earliest 
organizations on the scene was Bike 
Pittsburgh, which was incorporated  
in 2003. Perhaps because of its  
independence from the existing civic 
infrastructure, executive director 
Scott Bricker speculated, “no one 
knew what to do with us [the bicycle 
advocates].” The organization acted 
quickly on opportunities, as small  
as those ideas might have seemed  
at the time.  
The organization fueled its 
budding mission with incremental 
change, starting with items that 
“other cities took care of thirty years 
ago,” such as bike-rack installations. 
Because Pittsburgh has a robust 
network of off-street trails and 
comparatively low vehicular traffic, 
having deflated from a city of over 
675,000 in 1950 to one of around 
305,000 in 2010, cyclists were active 
in spite of the lack of on-street  
cycling facilities. Before the city had a 
bicycle master plan, Bike Pittsburgh 
published a bike map that literally put 
Pittsburgh’s cycling agenda in front  
of City Hall and caught the attention 
of then-Mayor Luke Ravenstahl. 
Ravenstahl, who became mayor at 
twenty-six, shared the view that 
multimodal streets should be part  
of a city trying to reinvent itself as a 
tech and innovation hub. Mayor 
Ravenstahl’s sustainable transporta-
tion initiatives were backed by 
then–city council member Bill Peduto 
(later elected mayor in 2013). 
Once the cycling community 
discovered that it had political allies,  
it picked up significant momentum. 
Starting in 2007, advocates pressured 
the city to add more than fifty street 
miles of Class 2 and 3 bike lanes.  
Bike commuting in Pittsburgh has 
increased by 408 percent since 2000, 
and the city is currently eleventh in  
the U.S. for its share of bicycle 
commuters. As the cycling community 
grew, it became more technically 
attuned and could demand 
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improvements of greater complexity. 
In 2013, the group crafted a “road 
shift” concept and worked with 
Pittsburgh’s Department of Public 
Works to redesign Pocusset Street 
from a vehicular road into a bicycle/
pedestrian way that could be main-
tained by the city. 
The bicycle advocacy communi-
ty’s wins were simply one facet of the 
city’s developing sustainable trans-
portation agenda. A multitude of 
other organizations started to focus 
on public spaces, placemaking (a 
people-centered approach to creating 
public places), and street-reclamation 
projects, especially around 2008, 
when Pittsburgh most intensely felt 
the national recession. Their work 
reoriented perceptions about the 
city’s transportation system, not 
necessarily entirely away from the 
all-encompassing transit funding 
crisis, but toward the idea that 
streets could be designed for people 
and that such treatments did not 
have to be expensive.  
Reformers also built on existing 
assets in the city. As it did for cycling, 
the underlying fundamentals of the 
city’s geography worked in the  
street reclaimers’ favor. Pittsburgh 
is geographically compact, with 
numerous neighborhoods that are 
each a capsule of livability with side-
walks, local stores, and schools. It  
has a very high percentage of pedes-
trian commuters, at 11.4 percent in 
2013. Every neighborhood has some 
kind of neighborhood association,  
and though they may not have 
contact with adjacent neighborhoods, 
there is strong pride of place and 
 local identity.  
With these assets, it is not 
surprising that numerous organiza-
tions, from the small, Garfield 
neighborhood–focused cityLAB to the 
Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership, 
found success in their micro-local 
experiments. CityLAB sponsored the 
Garfield Night Market, a street 
closure where local vendors created 
an evening shopping event, and the 
business-oriented Pittsburgh 
Downtown Partnership’s Project 
Pop-Up took street space for lunch-
time café tables and seating for its 
downtown constituents. It is no acci-
dent that this happened under the 
watch of Pittsburgh Downtown 
Partnership executive director Jeremy 
Waldrup. Waldrup joined the 
Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership in 
2011 after working for New York City’s 
Department of Small Business 
Services, which piloted pop-up 
programs for business improvement 
districts struggling to find ground-
floor tenants. 
Pittsburgh’s civic organizations, 
having now demonstrated several 
tangible benefits of changing the 
city’s transportation system, provided 
some additional muscle in the 2012 
battle to find sustainable funding 
from the state for the region’s trou-
bled public transportation program. 
These organizations joined the estab-
lished coalition consisting of the 
Allegheny Conference on Community 
Development and grassroots activist 
organizations such as Pittsburghers 
for Public Transit. The efforts of advo-
cacy groups in the Pittsburgh area 
represented the only real, structured 
transit-advocacy effort in the state, 
but the overall coalition reflected 
Pittsburgh’s historical pattern: it was 
a part of the larger Keystone 
Transportation Funding Coalition and 
largely industry-driven (Masciotra 
2013). 
Nonetheless, the accomplish-
ment of securing long-term 
transportation funding for the region 
will undoubtedly alleviate long-
standing concerns that have stood in 
the way of innovation. In 2015, we are 
seeing only the start of a challenge to 
the centralized and top-down method 
of urban change that has dominated 
Pittsburgh for decades. Recent polit-
ical developments in the city, county, 
and state governments, as well as 
within the public transit agency, have 
created more alignment in progres-
sive transportation than ever before.
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The bicycle advocacy 
community’s wins 
were simply one  
facet of the city’s 
developing sustain-
able transportation 
agenda. 
Fresh Perspectives and 
Regional Alignment
Disparate and uncoordinated 
leadership efforts have historically 
weakened Pittsburgh’s progress 
toward widespread transportation 
reform. The city serves as the county 
seat for Allegheny County, a county 
that includes 130 different municipal-
ities, yet the urbanized area around 
Pittsburgh includes more than one 
county. Thus, priorities often clash. 
Efforts to annex and consolidate 
cities and municipalities over the 
years, due in large part to the demand 
for greater regionalism from the 
business and civic communities, were 
unsuccessful. Allegheny County took 
steps toward regionalism when it 
restructured and adopted a home-
rule charter in 2000, placing the 
county under the leadership of an 
elected at-large county executive. 
While this model may have helped 
suburban residents feel more included 
in the decision-making processes of 
the county, for the most part it did 
little to help coordination between 
the City of Pittsburgh and the county. 
The area within county boundaries 
remains the focal point of mass 
transit under the management of the 
Port Authority of Allegheny County 
(PAT). These conflicting governance 
structures dilute the seat of power 
and, thus, control over transportation. 
Fragmented local governance 
additionally made it difficult to 
overcome state regulations that, at 
times, negatively affected transit 
operations in the county. As the 
county experienced depopulation 
and a reduction in its tax base, a 1997 
deregulation of utilities statewide 
whittled away real-estate taxes 
paid by utilities, a tax that made up 
the majority of dedicated funding 
for transit improvements. The Port 
Authority was forced to respond 
by raising fares, but the agency’s 
purse continued to come up short 
throughout the 2000s. 
An unlikely partner threw the 
first lifeline to revive the region’s 
transportation system. Faced with 
declining funds and local DOTs clam-
oring for more road capacity, Allen 
Biehler, secretary of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation 
from 2003 to 2011, updated the 
Transportation Improvement 
Program (TIP) to require better 
involvement from local governments 
and communities in transporta-
tion planning. The resulting Smart 
Transportation Program contex-
tualizes road designs with land use 
in addition to offering guidance for 
increasing the coordination and 
involvement of partners at all levels: 
metropolitan planning organizations 
(MPOs), elected officials, counties, 
municipalities, legislators, the Federal 
Highway Administration, and the 
Department of Transportation. It  
also resulted in a design guidebook  
for engineers, developed in partner-
ship with the New Jersey Department 
of Transportation. This type of  
collaboration was highly unusual 
among state DOTs and demon-
strated Biehler’s commitment to 
regional planning and integrating 
land-use and transportation prac-
tices. He and NJ DOT Commissioner 
Jack Lettiere knew that some of  
their most congested regions  
crossed jurisdictional boundaries and 
that no amount of additional road 
building could ameliorate their trans-
portation problems.  
Guidance alone has little effect 
on localities unless there are local 
champions, but Biehler added some 
strength to the program by creating 
a competitive funding program, 
the Pennsylvania Community 
Transportation Initiative, to incen-
tivize coordination between regional 
authorities. The selection committee 
awarded MPOs funding for transpor-
tation projects that were land-use 
efficient and could demonstrate 
interagency participation, and the 
program ultimately generated more 
pedestrian, cycling, and multimodal 
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transportation projects than a typical 
TIP in the state’s history (State Smart 
Transportation Initiative 2011). In the 
Pittsburgh region, the Southwestern 
Pennsylvania Commission (SPC) 
received three separate grants 
for sidewalk, transit, and highway 
improvements. Nonetheless, in the 
absence of coordinated local lead-
ership, the program only marginally 
affected the transportation land-
scape in Pittsburgh.  
 It was another state-level 
campaign that cast the first polit-
ical shake-up in sharp relief. As the 
Pittsburgh region mobilized yet  
again to negotiate with the state 
capital of Harrisburg for transpor-
tation funding in 2012, this time it 
had an unlikely advocate in its county 
executive. Rich Fitzgerald had a 
vision for the region’s transportation 
system as he entered office in 2010 
but quickly grew frustrated with PAT’s 
inability to respond to his directives 
for more real-time transit informa-
tion, better way-finding, and other 
service improvements. PAT seemed to 
“resist” even looking into Fitzgerald’s 
instructions, but in truth, after years 
of navigating budget and service 
cuts, PAT bristled at Fitzgerald’s input 
regarding what it considered to be  
its day-to-day operations. Though 
PAT receives significant funding from 
the county, it has operated as a nomi-
nally independent agency since its 
inception.  
 In 2012, as PAT faced another 
potential 35 to 40 percent service 
cut in order to balance its budget 
and negotiations with the state 
stalled, Fitzgerald decided that the 
county executive was not going to sit 
it out, and he muscled his way into 
the discussion. He found additional 
county funding to bring to the table 
and invited the unions to start nego-
tiating long before they thought they 
would have to enter the discussion. 
For the first time, the southwest 
region’s coalition for more trans-
portation funding had an elected 
official join in the fight, one who was 
politically savvy and knew how to 
appeal directly to state legislators. 
 Fitzgerald did not limit his 
involvement to the crisis. With 
transportation funding secure, he 
immediately redefined the PAT Board 
of Directors’ bylaws so that he could 
appoint four new directors and 
acted quickly to remove the general 
manager, whom he viewed as an 
obstacle to improving the region’s 
transit system. General manager 
Steve Bland was not incompetent; 
in fact, under his leadership, PAT 
received the Organization of the 
Year award from Bike Pittsburgh for 
the addition of bike racks to buses. 
Unsteady negotiations with state 
legislators and the agency’s refrain 
about prioritizing a cut of 35 percent 
in transit service, however, left him 
vulnerable to Fitzgerald’s ambitions. 
As Jack Brooks, former chairman 
of the PAT Board, said after the 5–3 
vote to remove Bland, “What did he 
do? He didn’t do anything wrong. The 
problem with Bland is [that] he’s an 
administrator, not a politician.” To all 
involved, though Bland did nothing 
wrong, it was Fitzgerald who was 
instrumental in getting the deal with 
the state done.  
 A different form of politics is 
taking root in Pittsburgh as new, 
progressive candidates challenge the 
longstanding political machine, one 
that mirrors the political turnover 
that Portland, Oregon, experienced in 
the early 1970s. It started in 2009 for 
Pittsburgh, when then-twenty-nine-
year-old Natalia Rudiak ran for a seat 
on City Council to represent what she 
described as “one of the most socially 
conservative districts” in the city 
(Meyerson 2014). She won. In 2013, 
Bill Peduto—a progressive who served 
for nineteen years on City Council, a 
self-proclaimed urbanist, and an early 
supporter of Bike Pittsburgh—won 
the mayoral election. On the same 
ballot, a few other seats on City 
Council faced progressive challengers. 
This de facto progressive caucus 
happened to come together with the 
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help of seasoned political operatives 
who were fresh off John Kerry’s 
presidential campaign in 2004, eager 
to apply their polling savvy and data 
analytics to a progressive cause. 
(Meyerson 2014) 
 Not only has a new crop of candi-
dates now replaced incumbents, a 
new type of government partnership 
has formed. Peduto and Fitzgerald 
have a close working relationship, 
developed from organizing the first 
City Council/County Council Summit 
years ago, when both served on their 
respective councils. They supported 
each other’s campaigns for mayor 
and county executive. And within eigh-
teen months since Peduto’s election, 
they addressed more transportation 
issues than had been addressed in the 
previous five years. Fitzgerald led a 
forty-person delegation to Cleveland 
to study the BRT HealthLine (a 
trip funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation). Fitzgerald and Peduto 
visited Copenhagen (with Bricker, 
head of Bike Pittsburgh, and funded 
by PeopleForBikes, a foundation) to 
experience a cycling city firsthand.
Fitzgerald’s announcement of the 
opening of bike lanes on three  
Pittsburgh bridges (maintained by 
the county) was complemented by 
Peduto’s announcement of his plan 
to add more than five miles of bike 
lanes in two years. Pittsburgh plans 
to launch a bike-sharing program in 
2015. This partnership bodes well for 
a city that had for so many decades 
been disjointed in its governance. 
“Having them working hand-in-hand 
on transportation improvements 
is the only way to be successful,” 
says Jeremy Waldrup, executive 
director of the Pittsburgh Downtown 
Partnership.  
 Peduto and Fitzgerald know that 
these improvements are possible 
only with the active support of the 
burgeoning class of civic organiza-
tions. Both are open about reforming 
political practices, of turning the 
“top-down on its head” and making 
room for citizen-led approaches. 
Peduto noted on a radio interview 
that Bike Pittsburgh now has more 
members than any single Democratic 
Party organization in the city. (He 
won without any endorsements from 
major Democratic Party backers, 
though he ran on the Democratic 
ticket.) Because the mayor’s office 
had developed a reputation for 
nepotism, he welcomed anyone who 
wanted to serve on his transition 
committees and then turned over the 
appointments to foundations and 
recruiting firms. He has created the 
city’s first Bureau of Neighborhood 
Empowerment, though its impact has 
yet to be proven.
Champions in the 
Institutions
Though the mayor and county execu-
tive are seasoned political operatives 
with ambitious agendas, they are 
bringing in new, nonpolitical staff 
to carry out their transportation 
agenda. They will be aided by planning 
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director Ray Gastil, who grew up 
in Seattle, served as Manhattan’s 
planning director from 2005 to 2009, 
and was the founding director of the 
Van Alen Institute, an architecture 
and urbanism civic organization 
based in New York. The city’s bicycle 
and pedestrian coordinator is Kristen 
Saunders, who worked with Jan Gehl 
Architects in San Francisco. Gehl was 
instrumental in Denmark’s trans-
formation from a car and parking 
city to a cycling city starting in the 
mid-1960s. Peduto also installed a 
new sustainability director, Grant 
Ervin. And in 2014, Scott Bricker 
from Bike Pittsburgh was appointed 
to the Southwestern Pennsylvania 
Commission, the region’s MPO, to 
serve as a Pittsburgh representative.  
 Though the practices that 
continue to guide the work of most 
city and state employees have not yet 
changed, there is at least the Smart 
Transportation Guidebook at the 
state level, which proposes a more 
progressive framework.
New Policies Reinforce Gains
With a growing, engaged civic 
community disconnected from big 
business interests but still committed 
to regional revitalization, a new 
political partnership free from past 
strictures, and several new state 
policies already in place, the future 
of sustainable urban transportation 
is bright for Pittsburgh. Because the 
changes are so new, it is too soon to 
wonder about durability. 
 Four major pieces of policy—two 
created years ago—will be critical 
tools for Pittsburgh’s new leaders. 
The first new policy is, of course, 
state-level funding for transit over 
the next several years. This offers 
a level of stability and removes the 
possibility of more service cuts to the 
transit system, allowing Pittsburgh 
to advance on other fronts. The 
importance of the urban interests of 
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia being in 
alignment to an otherwise rural state 
is essential for transit to be taken seri-
ously in the state capital.  
 The second is the state DOT 
competitive fund that rewards 
regional coordination in land-use 
and transportation planning. With 
local champions who can now utilize 
this tool to its highest potential, 
Pittsburgh may reap more benefits 
from the Smart Transportation 
Program. The Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania provides a healthy if 
rare example of a state government 
transportation department pursuing 
pro-urban policies.  
 Third, the Pittsburgh 
Development Fund established by 
former Mayor Tom Murphy in the 
mid-1990s, a revolving loan program 
that helps seed capital investment in 
the city, could ease the way for more 
innovation. This fund already helped 
Pittsburgh launch several revitaliza-
tion projects before there was the 
strong alignment in government that 
exists today.  
 Finally, in early 2015, Pittsburgh 
announced that it adopted a 
complete street policy. Our analysis 
has clearly shown that the mere 
adoption of policy is insufficient to 
guarantee implementation, but with 
the engagement of a growing civic 
group, new leadership at the city 
transportation department, and 
reform-minded agency staff joining 
the commitment, Pittsburgh has 
bettered the odds that it will achieve 
its ambitions.
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Chicago4 In less than four years, Chicago has catapulted from a city making iter-
ative progress in transportation 
to one that has captured national 
attention. Between 2011 and 2013, 
Chicago added forty-two miles of 
protected or buffered bike lanes to 
its network, launched the second-
largest bike-share system in the 
nation, established a zero-fatality 
policy, opened over 600 data sets, 
and is poised to invest heavily in 
grade-separated bus rapid transit. 
For two decades under Mayor Richard 
M. Daley, the city made gains in 
some visible aspects of its livability 
and sustainability agenda such as 
green roofs and selected parks. 
Yet the Chicago Department of 
Transportation (CDOT), an agency 
he established, was not able to 
make innovative leaps forward in 
transportation until he left office. 
Though Mayor Daley made some 
major symbolic changes, he lost 
momentum when reform efforts had 
to confront challenges stemming 
from internal agency culture and 
practices, among the most difficult 
challenges there are. Sustainable 
transportation goals have been on 
the advocacy and agency agenda for 
years, but they received a significant 
boost by outsider leadership planted 
at CDOT. Commissioner Gabe Klein 
implemented a clear vision and was 
empowered to take risks by Mayor 
Rahm Emanuel, the first incoming 
mayor in twenty-two years. 
Recent Alignment in  
Civic Priorities
Chicago has a robust civic sector 
of both businesses and advocates 
engaged in transportation, but their 
priorities were originally different 
from each other. After initial gains 
by bicycle advocates early in Daley’s 
tenure, business interests gained 
greater influence in defining trans-
portation priorities by the time he left 
office. Bicycle advocates, however, 
never stopped applying pressure. 
When Daley left office, these advo-
cates seized the opportunity to shape 
the agenda of Rahm Emanuel, Daley’s 
successor. 
 Chicago has a long history of civic 
organizations interested in urban 
development. For more than 100 
years, Chicago’s business community 
has promoted the city not only as 
the crossroads of America, but as a 
global capital. To shape Chicago into 
a “Paris on the Prairie” and accom-
modate rapid population growth, 
the Commercial Club of Chicago 
commissioned the Plan of Chicago in 
1909, better known as the Burnham 
Plan. From the plan came eighty-six 
successful bond initiatives for new 
boulevards, a new waterfront, and 
world-class museums and parks that 
set the tone for future plans and 
initiatives: grand and ambitious.  
 In 1934, as the Great Depression 
brought the Burnham Plan to a halt, 
the Metropolitan Planning Council 
(MPC) was established as a non-gov-
ernmental entity to address the city’s 
housing needs and carry out the plan’s 
vision. It grew to become an influential 
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civic organization dedicated to plan-
ning, occupying the role of a regional 
liaison that convened and coordi-
nated seven counties around housing 
and transportation issues.  
 The collapse of Chicago’s 
industrial base in the late twentieth 
century changed the direction of 
Chicago’s carefully drawn plans and 
created a new need for Chicago’s 
civic organizations. Mayor Harold 
Washington viewed empowering 
neighborhoods as a way to lift 
Chicago’s economic fortunes, and 
he helped to start a number of small 
community groups that coalesced 
around neighborhood transportation 
issues. Two of these were the Center 
for Neighborhood Technology (CNT), 
founded in 1978, and the Chicagoland 
Bicycle Federation, founded in 1985.  
 With the Federation leading 
on grassroots bicycle advocacy and 
CNT supporting it with knowledge 
applied to timely issues in order to 
influence policy, advocates netted 
early wins with Daley. These included 
the creation of the Mayor’s Bicycle 
Advisory Committee (MBAC), 
the Mayor’s Bicycle Ambassadors 
program, Chicago’s first bike plan 
in 1992, and the installation of 
thousands of bicycle racks. These 
progressive initiatives solidified 
the relationship between Daley’s 
MBAC and advocates, which Luann 
Hamilton, a twenty-seven-year 
veteran of CDOT, described as “close 
and collaborative,” and bought Daley 
support from bicycle advocates for 
the rest of his tenure. 
 Meanwhile, in response to the 
effects of deindustrialization that 
had started in the 1970s, the business 
community had a growing ambition 
to make Chicago globally competitive, 
but its focus was on large trans-
portation investments. In 1999, the 
Commercial Club created Metropolis 
2020, a consulting, research, and 
advocacy organization that lobbied 
successfully for the expansion of 
O’Hare International Airport and 
won Mayor Daley’s support for a 
downtown circulator, elevated train 
extensions to the region’s airports and 
improved rail freight connections – all 
perceived as economic imperatives 
more important than transportation 
reform.  
 As the business community’s 
priorities took center stage during 
the early 2000s, bicycle and public 
transit advocates began to shift 
their approach. With the creation 
of a strong public sector metropol-
itan planning organization (CMAP) 
in 2005, the Metropolitan Planning 
Council shifted its focus to proposing 
ambitious ideas for the Chicago 
region. As Chrissy Nichols, MPC’s 
Director of Research, describes it, 
“We need to be two steps ahead 
of government . . . with ideas that 
are realistic and palatable.” The 
Chicagoland Bicycle Federation 
has expanded beyond bicycle advo-
cacy to include walking and transit, 
rebranding itself as the  Active 
Transportation Alliance (ATA), and 
began providing consulting services to 
CDOT on its bicycle programs.  
 Throughout the 2000s, advo-
cacy organizations continued to lay 
the groundwork and build broad 
support for future transporta-
tion initiatives. One such proposal, 
MPC’s 100- mile, ten-route bus rapid 
transit (BRT) plan was informed 
and justified by CNT’s housing and 
transportation affordability index 
and was championed by the ATA. In 
2008, the plan gained widespread 
support from the Chicago Transit 
Authority, the Chicago Department 
of Transportation, and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation but 
lacked the necessary support from 
the Daley administration to imple-
ment it.  
 When Daley announced his inten-
tion not to campaign for another 
term in 2011, advocates seized the 
opportunity to shape the incoming 
administration’s transportation 
agenda. Before the election, the MPC, 
ATA, CNT, and six other environmental 
and transportation organizations 
jointly developed the Sustainable 
Transportation Platform, building 
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on years of advocacy with various 
communities in the region. Ron Burke, 
the ATA’s executive director, said the 
platform told the future mayor and 
the city, “This is what you should shoot 
for, now go do it.” In response, Mayor-
elect Emanuel placed many reformers 
on his transportation transition team 
and adopted the bicycle, BRT, and 
transit-oriented development recom-
mendations for his Transition 2011 
plan, which ultimately informed the 
official Chicago Fast Forward plan.  
New Leadership 
Relinquishes Old Ways
Daley viewed Chicago as a global city, 
and he prioritized transportation 
initiatives designed to raise the city’s 
global profile or ones that were polit-
ically expedient, as demonstrated by 
his administration’s lack of resolve on 
many of his ambitious proposals.  
 As mayor, his leadership on 
transit was focused on a few large 
projects, which is not surprising for 
a city with an aging rail system. In 
office when the system hit its lowest 
ridership in 1992, Daley focused 
on the rehabilitation of Chicago’s 
elevated lines. He concentrated on 
creating better connections between 
the region’s airports and improving 
circulation in the Loop, goals closely 
aligned with the business communi-
ty’s priorities and directly supporting 
his efforts to bring the 2016 Olympics 
to Chicago as well as his 2005 
Climate Action Plan.  
 The mayor and the department 
were initially progressive on bicycling, 
yet his leadership on the issue waned. 
He created the Mayor’s Bicycle 
Advisory Committee, the Mayor’s 
Bike Ambassadors program, and 
launched Chicago’s first bike plan 
three years into his tenure. Daley 
reorganized the public works depart-
ment in 1991 and created the Chicago 
Department of Transportation 
(CDOT) to manage the city’s streets. 
During his first two terms, his admin-
istration and CDOT were aggressive 
at obtaining newly created federal 
Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality 
Improvement (CMAQ) Program 
funding for bike parking, painted over 
100 miles of lanes, and advocated 
for the Bloomingdale trail. This work 
bought him goodwill with bicycle 
advocates that lasted his entire 
administration, somewhat paradox-
ically despite what seemed to be the 
Mayor’s waning interest in actual 
implementation.  
 In Daley’s second decade in City 
Hall, after gaining the support of 
the biking community, his adminis-
tration seemed to rest on its laurels 
and bike infrastructure and policy fell 
as a priority. The Bloomingdale trail 
proposed by CDOT in 1997 was never 
realized, and CDOT’s budget for bike 
infrastructure remained minimal 
under his administration. It took four-
teen years to draft a successor to the 
1992 bike plan. And after requesting 
proposals in 2007 for what would’ve 
have been the nation’s first bike-share 
program, his administration never 
followed through with the idea, even 
as programs launched in other cities 
such as Minneapolis and Washington, 
D.C.   
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 As ethics scandals roiled the  
later years of the Daley administra-
tion, the mayor moved his CDOT 
commissioners to other agencies, 
leaving the department without 
a consistent leader. From 2005 to 
2011, there were five different CDOT 
commissioners. Miguel d’Escoto, a 
close Daley aide and commissioner 
from 2001 to 2005, was forced to 
resign over a federal investigation 
into his department. D’Escoto was 
followed by a series of interim and 
deputy commissioners who appeared 
uninterested in transportation and 
lacked the management skills to 
operate an agency.  
 More recently, it appears that 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel shares Daley’s 
vision of Chicago as a global city 
competing for global talent, but unlike 
Daley, has committed to following 
through with a more holistic and 
detailed rethinking of the city’s street-
scape as key to achieving that goal. 
Emanuel expressed his belief that 
these improvements could attract 
global talent, stating “I expect not 
only to take all of their [Seattle and 
Portland’s] bikers but I also want all 
the jobs that come with this, all the 
economic growth that comes with 
this, all the opportunities of the future 
that come with this.” 
 Emanuel’s inclusion of many 
progressive advocates on his tran-
sition team, his adoption of many 
elements of their 2011 platform, 
and his choice for transportation 
commissioner empowered the advo-
cacy community. During his time as 
chief of staff in the Obama admin-
istration, Emanuel met Gabe Klein, 
the Washington, D.C., Department 
of Transportation commissioner 
and former CEO of Zipcar who had 
demonstrated a passion for reform 
and sustainable transportation. After 
his election, at the recommendation 
of reform advocates, Mayor Emanuel 
brought Klein onto his transition 
staff to aid the development of the 
Chicago 2011 Transition Plan. Soon 
after, Klein was named to lead CDOT. 
 Klein was given the task of 
getting the Chicago 2011 Transition 
Plan off the ground and, in compar-
ison to past commissioners, was 
given a long leash. Emanuel was 
outcomes-focused and wanted  
quick wins to add to his record. To 
achieve these wins, agency staff  
were encouraged to take risks and 
utilize pilot projects to implement 
changes quickly.   
 Similar to his predecessors, 
Klein didn’t serve long, staying only 
two years. Yet in contrast to past 
commissioners, Klein’s tenure was 
planned to be brief from the begin-
ning. Empowered by the mayor and 
supported by an engaged civic sector 
prepared for this policy window, 
Chicago’s innovation was rapid  
and impressive. 
Institutional Change
Since its creation in 1991 by Daley, 
CDOT was an agency that rarely 
had the leadership or guidance to 
pursue change on the street. Plagued 
by corruption and other political 
scandals and without a leader to 
articulate a vision and empower the 
staff, what little reform the agency 
could accomplish happened in a 
piecemeal manner.  
 As Rob Sadowsky, the executive 
director of the ATA from 2004 to 
2010, said to the Chicago Sun-Times 
in 2010, “Things have been happening 
in other cities, like Minneapolis and 
New York, that really made strides 
we’re not even coming close to. Part 
of that is a strong presence from 
the Department of Transportation’s 
commissioner level and strong 
backing from the mayor. We’re kind of 
lacking that in the city right now.”  
 In a city with a rich history of 
ambitious plans, CDOT was notice-
ably lacking one. In its twenty years 
of existence under Daley, CDOT had 
never drafted or implemented a 
comprehensive plan. Even CDOT’s 
vision statement, drafted at its 
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creation, was not made public until 
2011. Although it had a bike plan, a 
complete-streets policy, and street 
design guidelines, it lacked a unifying 
document. Furthermore, without a 
strong DOT commissioner who was 
given a mandate to pursue reform, 
agency staff would have little reason 
to risk doing things differently.  
 The election of Emanuel and the 
installation of Gabe Klein empowered 
reformers within the department. 
Klein’s appointment was short by 
design, and he was charged with 
getting many projects off the ground. 
First, Klein quickly created a clear, 
comprehensive plan unifying the 
department’s work that served as 
a mandate for the department. 
Klein described the 2011 Chicago 
Fast Forward plan as “. . . a plan for 
[CDOT]. This is more of an internal 
document, but we want to make it 
public, so people know what we’re 
working on.” It created a new mission 
statement for CDOT and committed 
the agency to the goals set out in the 
Chicago 2011 Transition Plan, many of 
which came from the ATA’s transpor-
tation platform. These benchmarks 
included 100 miles of protected bike 
lanes, the Divvy bike-share system, 
and bus rapid transit.  
 Part of this success came from 
framing these actions in terms of 
safety. Chicago enacted a zero-pe-
destrian-fatality plan (three years 
before New York City Mayor de Blasio 
embraced Vision Zero) and called for 
the department to act with urgency.  
 Although reform-minded CDOT 
staff had struggled without strong 
leadership, many were prepared 
when Gabe Klein took office. Under 
the previous commissioner, the fully 
funded Stony Island protected bike 
lane was scheduled to be completed 
in three years. After Klein’s appoint-
ment, staff opened the similar Kinzie 
Street protected bike lane within 
weeks. This new leadership quickly 
made an impact by empowering the 
staff and signaling that there was a 
new CDOT in charge.
Durability
The durability of these innovations is 
not secured, but the hiring of Rebekah 
Scheinfeld to succeed Gabe Klein is 
a strong start. The appointment of 
Scheinfeld, the planner behind the 
Ashland Avenue BRT project at CDOT 
and the Chicago Transit Authority, 
signals Emanuel’s commitment to 
that project. Although some key 
staffers have left—deputy commis-
sioner Scott Kubly was chosen to head 
Seattle’s DOT—many other long-
term staffers like Luann Hamilton, 
the deputy commissioner of project 
development, have stayed.  
 Under Klein, CDOT committed 
to publicly releasing annual updates 
of the Chicago Fast Forward plan 
to measure how the department is 
meeting its goals. The first update 
in 2013 showed the department far 
exceeding some and falling short on 
others. Klein reflected on the influ-
ence of Chicago Fast Forward, saying, 
“Publish a plan, even if people don’t 
read it, because it instills confidence 
in people that it’s been thought about 
and it shows transparency.” Long-
time CDOT director Luann Hamilton 
attributes recent success in Chicago 
to having the “right resources at the 
right time.” Advocates, staff, and 
leadership coalescing under a mayoral 
mandate led to rapid innovation at 
CDOT and in Chicago.  
 In 2015, Emanuel faced his first 
reelection campaign and narrowly 
won. While his polling numbers were 
low and he faced a competitive elec-
tion, transportation has not become 
a polarizing issue of the campaign, 
a testament to the popularity of 
the programs. In fact he made a 
point of campaigning at El stations. 
With his win, Chicago’s civic advo-
cates and reformists have another 
few years to ensure that the Mayor 
and CDOT build on the momentum 
already underway. This time, with new 
leadership at CDOT, the chances of 
overcoming the challenges of internal 
practices are even greater.
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Denver5 Over the last fifteen years, down-town Denver and the region as a 
whole have seen dramatic changes in 
transportation behavior and land use. 
The first phase of change occurred 
in the 1980s and 90s, when the 
Denver region faced growth-man-
agement and congestion challenges. 
Regional mayors and businesses 
banded together to build a new 
culture of collaborative problem 
solving, creating new institutions 
like a Metro Mayors Caucus and a 
regional economic development 
corporation to address those prob-
lems. Significantly, in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, they forged consensus 
that regional transit—and land 
use that supported transit—was 
essential to Greater Denver and 
succeeded in multiple campaigns to 
raise funding for transit. Unlike our 
examples from New York, Portland, 
Chicago, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere, 
transportation reformers in Denver 
had to reach an accommodation 
with road interests in order to attract 
widespread regional support for a 
multimodal transportation package 
that included a significant expansion 
of highways. This singular infusion 
of significant capital from one big 
ballot measure on one election day 
is also of a different character than 
the more incremental approaches 
we saw elsewhere. Also in contrast to 
those other case studies, the Denver 
example involved the engagement of 
suburban officials, not only those of 
the core city.  
 With transit and land-use 
improvements underway as a result 
of that single ballot measure, the 
city of Denver only more recently 
turned toward active transportation 
on city streets, this time advanced 
by a different coalition of Denver 
civic leaders, elected champions, 
and agency staff than the coalition 
that had championed the transit 
and road mega-projects. Spurred on 
by the success of a temporary bike-
share system opened for the 2008 
Democratic National Convention, 
Denver Mayor John Hickenlooper 
and many civic leaders worked to 
establish a citywide bike-share 
program. The city followed through 
by making important staff hires that 
advanced safer biking infrastructure, 
while grassroots advocates gained 
enough strength to keep active 
transportation on the city’s agenda 
even after a change in the mayoral 
administration. Today more than half 
of downtown Denver employees get 
to work via transit, biking, or walk-
ing—a remarkable change for a place 
that two decades ago was a quint-
essential western U.S. auto-oriented 
conurbation. 
FasTracks: Regional 
Business and Politicians 
Come Together
Denver is known for having one of the 
most collaborative regional politics 
in the country. But it wasn’t always 
that way. As Bruce Katz and Jennifer 
Bradley write in Metropolitan 
Revolution, city-suburb relations 
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reached a low point during the 
“annexation battles” of the 1960s 
and 70s. At the time, Denver was 
engaged in the active annexation 
of unincorporated territory at its 
borders in order to grow its commer-
cial tax base and add white families 
to its school system. Many suburban 
residents resisted, first by incorpo-
rating into new jurisdictions, and 
then by proposing and passing the 
so-called Poundstone Amendment, a 
state constitutional amendment that 
severely limited Denver’s ability to 
annex land. The overall effect of this 
era was pronounced fragmentation in 
the region. 
 But starting in the 1980s, when 
the region’s economy was suffering 
from the effects of an energy bust 
and a nationwide recession, Denver-
area business leaders and politicians 
began a concerted effort to knit  
the region back together. In contrast 
to established forms of regionalism 
in Minneapolis-St Paul and Portland 
which were constituted entirely 
 by government, regionalism Denver-
style originated in the private sector. 
Business leaders created a new 
institution, the Greater Denver 
Corporation (later renamed the 
Metro Denver Economic Development 
Corporation) and set explicit goals 
of stopping conflicts between local 
economic development offices and 
positioning the region to compete 
globally. Complementing the business 
elite’s efforts, Greater Denver– 
area politicians created another 
institution, a Metro Mayors Caucus, in 
1993. The caucus, which has grown to 
include forty members, has no formal 
power but is an influential political 
force because it is not only a forum 
for discussion but regularly takes 
positions on issues. The caucus makes 
all decisions by consensus, allowing 
the region to speak with one voice on 
critical state issues.  
 Both the Metro Mayors Caucus 
and business leaders came to a 
consensus early on that an expanded 
transit network was key to the 
region’s growth and that increases 
in revenue to pay for such a network 
were justifiable. This added substan-
tial weight to what had been an  
often quixotic effort by the Denver 
Regional Transportation District 
(RTD) to build fixed-route transit. 
RTD had been advocating for a 
regional transit network since 1970 
but had managed to scrape together 
funding for just one light rail line, 
which opened in 1994.  
 The Metro Mayors Caucus took 
up this cause as well. Its first effort 
was to back RTD’s 1997 Guide the Ride 
initiative, which would have raised 
a regional sales tax by 0.4 percent 
to pay for transit expansion. The 
initiative, however, failed at the polls. 
Many observers blamed fundamental 
tactical errors or lack of confidence 
in existing institutions; it was unclear 
what RTD would spend the new 
money on or why it chose the invest-
ment corridors it did. Another factor 
was a strong distrust of the agency, in 
large part because its elected board 
of directors comprised a dysfunc-
tional mix of “cranks, transit activists 
and semi-retired politicians,” in the 
words of a local journalist. Not helping 
matters, RTD’s board chair, Jon 
Caldara, was an outspoken opponent 
of rail and campaigned against the 
Guide the Ride initiative. 
 In response to public distrust 
of RTD, mayors and businesses 
supported a new civic organization 
called the Transit Alliance, which 
advocated for new transit and 
bolstered public support by culti-
vating civic leaders supportive of 
transit expansion, several of whom 
went on to win election to the RTD 
board over anti-rail incumbents.  
 The combination of mayoral, 
business, and Transit Alliance support 
turned the tide for rail in Denver. 
Voters approved new bonds for the 
Southeast Rail Line in 1999 and in 
2004 passed a regional sales tax 
increase for FasTracks, a program 
of seven rail lines and an overhaul 
of Denver Union Station to be 
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completed by 2017. FasTracks was 
approved by voters despite opposition 
from Governor Bill Owens and state 
Republicans, who had called for what 
they considered a “more balanced” 
approach that combined highway 
widening with fewer new transit lines. 
 Mayors were willing to pair 
transit expansion with road spending 
if doing so seemed necessary to win 
over voters, especially in the more 
road-oriented suburbs. In 1999, the 
Metro Mayors Caucus and the Transit 
Alliance campaigned not only for the 
light rail measure, but also for a ballot 
measure that widened a parallel 
highway. In 2009, they supported a 
state law that raised car fees to fund 
bridge repair, local roads, and transit. 
As of 2015, the caucus is backing a 
proposal for a statewide tax dedi-
cated to both roads and transit, 
known as MPACT64.  
 This regional consensus for 
transit has held together even during 
difficult times. In 2008, it became 
clear that FasTracks was running into 
problems: the sales tax was bringing 
in less than forecasted, projects 
were hitting cost overruns, and the 
program could not be completed 
on time without additional revenue. 
Two years of bad headlines followed, 
but regional support for transit did 
not wane. The Metro Mayors Caucus 
rejected an RTD proposal to shorten 
planned lines in order to save money 
and instead announced it would 
support new efforts to raise revenue 
for transit. (Subsequent polls have 
shown lukewarm public support 
for a new regional tax despite high 
approval of FasTracks. The caucus 
has delayed mounting a campaign 
and instead supported the measures 
described above.) 
 The region’s mayors have also 
been steadfast in their support for 
transit-supportive land use, which 
is consistent with Denver’s culture. 
Growth management and pres-
ervation of open space have been 
priorities of governors and citizens 
since the 1960s. But the general desire 
has yielded limited results. While 
there is a cultural appetite for smart 
growth, Coloradans have a libertarian 
streak that tends to prioritize a small 
government role, especially regarding 
so-called property rights. The result 
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has been voluntary regional agree-
ments, such as a nonbinding growth 
boundary established by Denver-area 
municipalities. State laws enable, 
but do not require, localities to plan 
and manage growth. Suburbs in the 
Denver region also began experi-
menting with New Urbanism in the 
1990s, relatively early in the move-
ment’s history.  
 In the years prior to the passage 
of FasTracks, Denver made a signif-
icant decision to adopt new zoning 
to allow higher-density, mixed-use 
development around transit stations. 
FasTracks was always described as 
both a transit and land-use program, 
and this has been backed up by policy. 
In 2006, the city developed an overall 
transit-oriented development (TOD) 
strategic plan and began devel-
oping several station-area plans. 
RTD began publishing annual TOD 
Status Reports in 2005. The region’s 
metropolitan planning organiza-
tion, the Denver Regional Council of 
Governments, maintains a database 
of TOD developments. 
 In 2010, the city finished a 
complete overhaul of its zoning code, 
replacing a 1950s standard with a 
form-based code that has made 
mixed-use development “simpler, less 
contentious, and cheaper,” according 
to the Denver Business Journal. These 
policies have had a clear effect: popu-
lation density in Denver grew from 
3,050 people per square mile in 1990 
to 3,922 in 2010. 
 In recent years, transit advo-
cacy has moved beyond a simple 
pro-transit message and now encom-
passes broader issues of community 
leadership, environmental justice, 
and equity. The Transit Alliance, which 
was originally created to support 
the FasTracks plan, has taken on a 
new role of educating community 
leaders about transit. In 2010, local 
and national foundations created 
Mile High Connects, a partnership 
of public, private, and nonprofit 
organizations that works to increase 
access to housing, jobs, schools, and 
services via public transit and provides 
financing instruments for TOD. 
Civic Urbanism Grows in 
Downtown Denver
Colorado has long been known as a 
hotbed for biking, hiking, and other 
outdoor pursuits, and the Denver 
region was already well known for 
an extensive trail network. But this 
interest in biking as recreation did not 
translate into biking and walking as 
everyday transportation. Denver’s 
most successful bike advocacy group, 
BikeDenver, was created in 2001 but 
struggled to make headway despite 
an ambitious city bicycle plan. The 
city had a Mayor’s Bicycle Advisory 
Committee, but former committee 
chair John Hayden says that when 
he first started attending meet-
ings, “there was little interest from 
anyone other than hard-core bicycle 
advocates” and the meetings “had 
a distinctly fatalistic view of bicy-
cling in Denver.” In 2005, the League 
of American Bicyclists, which had 
named Denver a Silver Bike-Friendly 
Community, downgraded the city’s 
rating to bronze, citing Denver’s 
failure to fulfill promises made in the 
2001 bicycle plan. 
 From there, Denver made signif-
icant strides to improve biking and 
walking, spurred on by advocates 
and champions within government. 
Business organizations again played 
an early role, recognizing that the 
regional transit build-out approved 
in 2004 could be transformational. 
In 2005, the Downtown Denver 
Partnership convinced the city to 
cooperate to develop a Downtown 
Area Plan. The plan, released in 
2007, served as a full-throated call 
for urbanism. “The development 
of both FasTracks and a comple-
mentary local transit system will 
make transit-based living possible in 
Downtown,” the plan says. It called 
for downtown Denver to build around 
Union Station and Civic Center 
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Station, the creation of a free-fare 
zone downtown, expanded bus 
connections to adjacent neighbor-
hoods, designation of the downtown 
area as a “pedestrian priority zone,” 
conversion of one-way streets to 
two-way, and accommodation of 
bicycles on all downtown streets. 
 Denver was then selected to 
host the 2008 Democratic National 
Convention, creating an opportu-
nity to put these recommendations 
into practice. In the run-up to the 
convention, Hickenlooper challenged 
advocates and civic leaders to make 
the DNC the greenest convention in 
history. One of the resulting initia-
tives was a temporary bike-sharing 
program, Freewheelin, created 
by the health insurance company 
Humana and the bicycle-focused 
philanthropy Bikes Belong (now called 
PeopleForBikes). 
 Freewheelin was used over 5,500 
times during the four-day convention, 
becoming an eye-opener for many. 
According to Piep van Heuven, who  
at the time was a Bikes Belong 
volunteer manager, “the project was 
so visible” and changed bike sharing 
from a “wacky idea” into a success 
story that “stamped Denver as a bike-
friendly place.”  
 Advocates described Free-
wheelin as an eye-opener for Mayor 
Hickenlooper as well. Before the 
system opened, he told advocates 
that Denver should aim for 10 
percent of commuting trips to be by 
bike by 2018. After the convention, 
Hickenlooper told his staff he wanted 
Denver to be the first U.S. munic-
ipality with a citywide bike-share 
system and enlisted his sustainability 
office to advance the project. The 
Convention Host Committee  
donated one million dollars toward  
a permanent bike-share system. 
Parry Burnap, who had led the 
convention’s Greening Initiative, was 
hired to lead Denver Bike Sharing, 
a nonprofit created to roll out and 
manage that system. 
 Biking and walking became a 
higher priority in city departments as 
well. The public works department 
hired a senior city planner dedicated 
solely to bicycle and pedestrian proj-
ects, Emily Snyder. Both advocates 
and the media have called her a 
“driving force” for biking in the city. 
“She brought passion and an ability to 
create new relationships” both with 
external advocates and other city 
staffers, said Aylene McCallum of the 
Downtown Denver Partnership. 
 Grassroots and business advo-
cates were also becoming more 
powerful. After the convention, Piep 
van Heuven was hired as BikeDenver’s 
first professional executive director.  
In 2009, the Partnership organized  
a fact-finding trip to New York City for 
advocates and city staffers, including 
Emily Snyder and traffic engineer 
Justin Schmitz. After returning from 
that trip, Denver staff designed 
the city’s first buffered bike lane on 
Champa Street, which opened in 
2010. 
 B-Cycle launched in 2010 with 
500 bikes, making it the largest 
municipal bike-sharing program in  
the country at the time. Later that 
year, Hickenlooper was elected 
governor of Colorado. Michael 
Hancock, a Denver City Council 
member, succeeded him as mayor. 
Under Hancock, the public works 
department has built on the progress 
made under Hickenlooper, proposing 
and building bolder street designs.   
 Transit and bicycle advocates 
say that the sense of urgency present 
during the Hickenlooper administra-
tion was not initially present under 
Hancock. In response, they cultivated 
members of the city council. “We 
asked ourselves: How do we fund a 
bike project in every council district? 
The city council’s now asking the 
questions [BikeDenver] used to ask” in 
budget hearings and public meetings, 
van Heuven said.  
 Active transportation has stayed 
on the city’s agenda in part because 
grassroots advocates have continued 
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Active transportation 
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to grow in strength. BikeDenver now 
has over 500 dues-paying members, 
compared to fewer than 100 in 2008. 
The city now has a pedestrian advo-
cacy group, WalkDenver, which was 
founded in 2011 and convinced the 
city to create a Mayor’s Pedestrian 
Advisory Committee in 2014. The 
region also boasts popular livable 
streets and urbanism blogs like 
DenverUrbanism and DenverInfill. 
 In 2011, the city adopted the 
Denver Moves strategic plan, which 
set even more ambitious goals than 
the 2008 plan, including reaching a 
bicycle commute share of 15 percent 
and putting every household within a 
quarter-mile of a “high ease-of-use” 
route. It called for striped bike lanes  
on more than a dozen downtown 
streets. A 2014 plan update (which 
has not yet been adopted) would 
replace nearly all of them with 
physically protected lanes. Planners 
have also proposed cycle tracks and 
bus-only lanes in neighborhoods 
outside downtown.  
 Change is happening on the 
street, too. The city opened its first 
protected bike lane in May 2014, on 
15th Street. Pressure from BikeDenver 
and other advocates helped convince 
the public works department to 
make the lane physically separated, 
after the initial design called for a 
buffered lane. Mayor Hancock took 
the inaugural ride down the lane and 
celebrated the lane—as well as public 
transit, transit-oriented develop-
ment, and the bike-share program—in 
his 2014 State of the City address. 
Durability
Denver is still an emerging region 
when it comes to transit and 
people-oriented streets. For one, 
local mayors have often proved 
willing to accept or even demand 
new road spending as a necessary 
political trade for transit revenue. 
To the extent that this money goes 
to widen highways, it could be 
counterproductive for the region. 
Furthermore, the city of Denver has 
not yet experienced a “bikelash” of 
media and public criticism of sustain-
able-streets infrastructure. As the city 
adds to its one protected bike lane 
and does more to reconfigure street 
space, public backlash could surpass 
anything officials have dealt with 
so far. That would be an important 
political test for both civic and elected 
leaders. 
 That said, Denver leaders have 
already overcome several potential 
hurdles that could have knocked the 
region off its path toward transpor-
tation sustainability. Both urban and 
suburban mayors have been stead-
fast in their support of the FasTracks 
vision for regional transit, even when 
the program faced a crisis in 2009. 
Mayoral support for sustainable 
streets in Denver has also survived 
the change in administration from 
Hickenlooper to Hancock. The public 
works staff remains empowered, 
incorporating ambitious biking infra-
structure into neighborhood plans 
and embracing more dramatic mode-
share targets.  
 The rollout of new projects 
and policies, combined with a 
strengthening civic sector, will help 
keep Denver on the path. Four new 
rail lines are scheduled to open in 
2016, connecting large swathes of 
the region to downtown Denver 
via transit. The Denver rezoning 
and regional TOD policy will make 
it easier for walkable and tran-
sit-friendly development to continue 
throughout the region. Denver’s 
biking and walking advocates have 
professionalized and grown in their 
influence, and business interests have 
embraced urbanism. Transit advocacy 
is growing to include issues of afford-
able housing near rail stations, social 
equity, and community engagement. 
The accomplishments of Denver’s 
past transportation leaders—and the 
continued commitment of its current 
ones—have positioned the region well 
for future transportation innovation.
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Major rail projects 
completed but 
potential impact 
muted by lack of 
systemic reform.
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Charlotte6 Like many of our other case studies, Charlotte’s interest in urban devel-
opment stems from the pursuit of 
economic growth by both govern-
ment and business interests and their 
desire to transform the city from a 
crossroads for rural trade into a global 
financial marketplace. In its pursuit 
of sustainable transportation, the 
city itself seems to be at a crossroads 
when we analyze it through our 
theory of change.  
 Charlotte stands out because 
its highly visible rail projects have not 
been matched with systemic reforms 
to the streetscape. The attention it 
garnered for its municipal leader-
ship and initiatives to improve public 
transportation and infrastructure is 
well-deserved, but stands in contrast 
to most of the local stakeholder 
interviews that describe a human-
scale transportation movement still 
emerging. Although it has invested 
in multiple transportation modes, 
comprehensive reform has yet to 
surface. This may be a result of the 
relative newness of Charlotte’s civic 
advocates, many of whom are in 
stark contrast to Charlotte’s longest-
standing advocates, its corporations. 
It is still too early to tell how much 
influence the fledgling civic groups 
"will have over the corporate giants. 
As one of the ten fastest-growing 
regions in the country in terms of 
population and per capita income 
in the last twenty years, Charlotte’s 
success feeds its ambitions while it 
simultaneously attracts a new class 
of professionals that could fuel a 
wholly different form of advocacy and 
civic engagement.
Business-Based Civic 
Leadership
Similar to the situation in many 
other cities across the United States, 
Charlotte’s civic environment has 
been historically dominated by  
corporations. In this case banks 
were the primary drivers of the city’s 
economy. Over the last thirty years, 
these global corporate entities 
wanted to attract global labor and 
thus “needed to feel that they were 
in a headquarters city.” They have 
tended to support big infrastructure 
projects, though in Charlotte, they  
did place quality-of-life issues and 
public transportation high on their  
list of city must-haves (Smith and 
Graves 2005). 
 Unlike other case study cities, the 
business elite did not initially form 
an independent organization that 
conducted urban planning studies 
on behalf of their interests. For 
decades, there was no Regional Plan 
Association or Metropolitan Planning 
Council or Allegheny Conference on 
Community Development as there is 
in New York or Chicago or Pittsburgh; 
the business elite in Charlotte simply 
met individually or through the 
Chamber of Commerce. A non-gov-
ernmental, non-private, regionally 
oriented civic organization still does 
not exist in Charlotte, leaving a 
vacuum of civic leadership that is 
balanced, regional and mode agnostic 
in outlook. Perhaps worse, the strong 
role of corporations limits opportu-
nities for community-based groups 
to lodge any input about neighbor-
hood-level desires. 
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 The corporations’ historic prefer-
ence for large infrastructure solutions 
narrowed the scope of the urban 
development agenda. Center City 
Partners (CCP), largely launched by 
Bank of America in the late 1990s, 
is the public-private business part-
nership for the central business 
district of Charlotte. Its agenda 
tended historically to focus more on 
the building footprints of its largest 
members—their key assets—and on 
large infrastructure projects and 
historically paid less notice to other 
fine-grained issues, such as walk-
ability, street design, and parking 
management.  
 Charlotte’s most successful coali-
tions were public-private partnerships 
to fund infrastructure. A multi-
modal hub planned for the Center 
City neighborhood was initiated at 
the behest of Bank of America and 
matched by state and federal funds. 
The light rail Lynx project was the 
result of a feasibility study funded by 
corporations. Streetcar and light rail 
projects were initiated by businesses. 
When there was an elected official 
who shared the vision of the corpo-
rations, the project moved forward. 
The existing light rail projects were 
the result of the corporations working 
with former mayors Pat McCrory 
(now Governor of North Carolina) and 
Anthony Foxx (now U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation) and with all parties 
viewing transit projects as a boon to 
their city’s image, making Charlotte 
more “like a headquarter city.” (Smith 
and Graves 2005)  
 Preferences are now shifting. 
More recently CCP has become more 
engaged in making Uptown and 
South End more pedestrian-friendly, 
promoting placemaking (a people-fo-
cused approach to creating public 
spaces) on the Rail Trail alongside 
the Lynx Blue Line light rail and 
supporting a bike-share program. Its 
2020 Vision Plan includes a section 
on sustainable transportation, a new 
goal compared to past plans. 
 
 The lack of civic organizations 
to broadcast the public support for 
sustainable transportation may have 
hindered the execution of big plans. 
Though there is corporate support 
for the light rail lines, corporations did 
not give similar weight to bike lane 
additions that would complement 
the light rail network. In the past, 
organizations that were focused on 
small-scale aspects of transporta-
tion found it difficult to survive. The 
Charlotte Area Bicycle Coalition, a 
result of renewed interest in bicycling 
in the 1990s, is nearly defunct. Even  
in its heyday, it maintained a relatively 
narrow focus on bicycle safety  
education and did not venture into 
advocacy for new street designs. The 
regional transportation system is 
fragmented as a result. The bicycle 
network continues to lack crucial 
links between destinations and along 
popular corridors. 
 In fact, some scholars speculate 
that because business ambitions 
loom so large and strong in Charlotte 
there appears to be “no sustained 
need for citizens in general to actively 
engage civic leaders on most issues” 
(Bacot 2008). It’s not that Charlotte’s 
leaders do not innovate—civic and 
government leaders in Charlotte 
often apply private-sector manage-
ment tools, such as doing away with 
sector-focus agencies like “housing 
services” in favor of goals such as 
“improving shelter” with performance 
benchmarks, and they often launch 
new programs focused on urban 
renewal.  Rather, citizens tend to 
withdraw from proactively offering 
input and seem to be “confident that 
the decision makers are serving their 
interests” (Bacot 2008). But if neigh-
borhood-level pedestrian and bicycle 
improvements are not on the agenda 
of the region’s corporations, concerns 
about walking and biking will fall to 
the side, especially if there are few 
other forums to highlight topics of 
local interest to neighborhoods.
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public consistently 
supports sustainable 
transportation.
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There is promise. First, public opinion 
swings in the transportation innova-
tion direction. Even without a strong 
civic organization advocating for 
public transit, the public consistently 
supports sustainable transporta-
tion. In 1998, Mecklenburg County 
voters agreed to a half-cent tax to 
finance the 2025 Integrated Transit/
Land-Use Plan, which included many 
of the light rail projects that were 
constructed as well as zoning for 
transit-oriented development. Even 
when a small anti-tax campaign 
tested the appeal of the transit 
tax in 2007, Mecklenburg residents 
voted again to keep the tax, with 
70 percent voting for it compared 
to 30 percent against. True to form, 
major corporations (Duke Energy, 
Wachovia, Bank of America) and 
other firms that would directly 
benefit from the transit investment 
(Parsons Brinckerhoff, McDonald 
Transit Associates, Siemens) funded 
the campaign to keep the transit tax. 
This does not mean that the public 
did not also support the plan. A 2012 
poll of 800 Mecklenburg County 
voters conducted by Public Opinion 
Strategies and Fairbank, Maslin, 
Maullin, Metz & Associates found that 
voters continued to support public 
transit investment over cars, with 61 
percent of those polled more willing to 
invest in public transportation than in 
building new roads, which garnered 25 
percent of the votes.  
Second, new voices are emerging 
and are rapidly gaining strength. 
Sustain Charlotte and its 
Transportation Choices Alliance, 
launched in 2014 after a year of 
research and interviews, enjoys 
growing popularity. A number of small 
civic groups that employ tactical 
urbanism strategies are building on 
the sidewalk and complete-streets 
programs that were started in the 
late 2000s (discussed in more detail 
below). The Knight Foundation has 
funded Center City Partners to work 
with Gehl Studio to create a public 
space framework for Uptown. Groups 
are working on programming for 
vacant blocks and temporary street 
closures. These efforts are starting 
to diversify the perspectives on 
Charlotte’s urban development, and 
they now include a strong sustainable 
transportation angle, though it is too 
early to judge the overall impact. 
Political Leadership
Charlotte has benefited from strong 
mayoral and city council leadership in 
support of sustainable transporta-
tion, but its focus tends to emphasize 
corporate preferences, which largely 
favor large infrastructure projects. 
The Gateway Station Project, the 
multimodal hub initiated by Bank of 
America, stalled when former mayor 
Anthony Foxx left Charlotte to join the 
federal government (it has since  
been reinvigorated).  
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 Relative to reform, the city 
government is not opposed to 
restructure or change but has done 
so with varying degrees of success. 
The motto of the city has been “The 
Business of Charlotte is Business” 
since the 1970s, and many polit-
ical leaders have recognized that 
a business-friendly city with global 
aspirations requires transit and 
attention to quality-of-life issues. The 
City Within a City Initiative, created 
in 1993 by the city manager to focus 
on quality-of-life issues and address 
neighborhood fragmentation, was 
accompanied by a departmental 
reorganization in which twenty-six 
city departments became nine key 
departments and four supporting 
government-run businesses. 
Even with a community-oriented 
department such as the Office of 
Neighborhood Development, trans-
portation can fall between the cracks. 
 An effect of this kind of restruc-
turing is that it dilutes how much the 
mayor can hold staff responsible for 
specific programs. Danny Pleasant, 
the current head of Charlotte DOT 
is credited as an effective leader for 
transportation innovation and is 
active with the National Association 
of City Transportation Organizations. 
At the same time, there is potential 
to add more reform-minded staff 
that can find ways around the state 
bias for roads and highways and local 
inertia. The DOT’s transportation 
plans could be further connected 
to the neighborhoods and provide 
a visionary framing. Furthermore, 
without the civic sector’s mouthpiece, 
a reform-minded DOT can only make 
limited progress.
Agency Changes
In Charlotte, many progressive  
transportation policies were put in 
place decades ago, but still lack  
implementation today. There has 
been insufficient critical mass  
from within the city and agencies  
to enact progressive policies or  
local ambitions. 
 Case in point, North Carolina 
issued the first state-level bicycle 
policy in 1974, when it required the 
North Carolina Department of 
Transportation to recognize the 
bicycle as a vehicle that had the right 
to be on the road. North Carolina 
issued bicycle design guidance in  
1993. More recently, the state DOT 
created a full department of bicycle 
and pedestrian transportation with 
its state transportation policy  
update in 2011. This state department 
is part of the transit/rail/aviation 
department, however, rather than the 
street planning department, which 
limited its understanding of how 
to effectively aid cities. As a result, 
the state DOT’s funding formulas 
continue to make local bicycle and 
pedestrian project funding very diffi-
cult. Without municipal political and 
civic leadership and broad-based local 
public support to find ways to direct 
that funding more appropriately, 
state-level policies could not be trans-
lated into local action.  
 Relative instability among the 
government administration may 
also play a role. Charlotte has a short 
mayoral term of two years, resulting 
in administrative changeover rela-
tively frequently. The Charlotte Area 
Transit System, the city’s transit 
authority, was created only in 1999. 
The city adopted its first city trans-
portation plan in 2006 and followed 
that with urban street design 
guidelines in 2007 to change city 
ordinances in order to encourage 
more human-oriented designs. Many 
state legislative seats turned to 
Republicans in the 2014 election and 
the overall state government has 
just become very anti-urban, posing 
greater challenges to Charlotte’s 
advocates and political leader-
ship. The Charlotte Department of 
Transportation has a strategic plan, 
but the department has to overcome 
a long history of car-oriented views 
68
A People’s History of Recent Urban Transportation Innovation
elsewhere in the community, at the 
state DOT level, and at the state 
legislative level. 
 With this fragmented envi-
ronment, Charlotte makes spotty 
progress. It has a complete-streets 
policy, and its DOT redesigned East 
Boulevard into a model complete 
street, winning the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s 2009 award for 
Smart Growth Achievement. The city 
has constructed $88 million worth of 
complete streets since the ordinance 
change. In spite of all the policies in 
support of complete streets, walk-
ability continues to be an issue and 
according to the 2012 Charlotte 
Quality of Life Survey, 76 percent of 
the city still commutes by single-oc-
cupancy cars. To encourage walking, 
a sidewalk program created in 1999 
was redesigned, relaunched in 2011, 
and the city devotes $7.5 million per 
year of its annual budget to build new 
sidewalks. Again, the impact is still 
to be determined. The city recently 
hired a pedestrian/bicycle manager 
to shepherd more walkability projects, 
yet the longstanding city policy of not 
requiring sidewalks and maintenance 
for most developments means that 
the dedicated staffer plays catch-up.  
 In sum, some critical policy pieces 
for transportation innovation are 
in place, but a stronger and more 
dynamic civic voice that can represent 
public support for politicians and 
boost their courage, a voice that can 
match that of corporations, is much 
needed in Charlotte. With its civic 
movement still emerging, Charlotte is 
still searching for stable footing that 
would propel it to its potential.
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A robust civic 
sector is the 
single most 
prevalent factor 
among all the 
cities we studied.
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